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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE TERMINOLOGY:
“LAW” AND “ETHICS”
Summary: 1. Introduction. 2. A short view on the interaction between law
and social norm.  3.  The definitions of Law and Social Norm.  4.  What is
meant by “culture”? 5. What is meant by “formal institutions”?
1) Introduction.
Influencing other people behavior is probably one of the most ancient
and powerful goals that men could conceive. To gain it, there have always
been two ways: brute force and imposition/acceptance of rules.
The rules  or,  as  it  would  be  better  to  call  them,  “institutions”1,  can  be
divided into two types: formal and informal. In this section, we will simply
consider the first as “laws” and the latter as “social/moral norms”.
In both, we find two constant elements: a precept (that is what one have to
do or to abstain from) and a sanction, a penalty due to enforce it.
Illegal  behavior  is  sanctioned  by  specific  means,  while  immoral  or
improper  behavior  causes  blame,  ostracism,  marginalization  (but
sometimes also something different, as we will see).
1 We will follow the definition given by North (1991), within his work: “Institutions”. For further 
explanations, please refer to the sixth footnote.
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History is a magnificent anthology of laws and social norms: the first
known collection of laws, the Code of Hammurabi,  dates back to about
1754 B.C., or the Duodecim Tabularum Leges of ancient Rome to 451-450
B.C., just for examples.
Furthermore, the Decalogue: the basic code for Christians and Hebrews,
given from God to Moses on Mount Sinai – according to the Bible, Ancient
Testament2.
In every time and in every context, surely, we have institutions: they can be
written,  elaborate,  complicated (just  like in  our  countries,  nowadays) or
basic verbal rules (like in some isolated and primitive tribes that survive in
Africa,  Oceania  or  South  America).  But  they  all  have  an  unique  goal:
maintaining the established order and prevent antisocial behavior; or, to be
more  precise,  to  ensure  a  behavioral  equilibrium,  aimed  to  encourage
cooperation and to reduce transaction costs.
People, actually, may respect the law because they believe that it is
right and appropriate or just because they only want to avoid penalties and
ostracism. But, as already mentioned, the law is not the only factor that is
able to influence people's actions: indeed, also the “social norms” do that.
Its meaning and its importance – regarding the influence on human
behavior  –  will  be  discussed  in  detail  later;  for  now,  we  have  just  to
consider  that  social  norms  involve  values,  ethics,  moral,  habits  and
2 The ten commandments appeared in the Exodus and in the Deuteronomy, both books of the Old 
Testament.
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customs.  All  of  them are  taught  us  since  our  childhood,  by  influential
sources such as parents, then teachers, friends and all the other people we
come in contact during life.
Sometimes, what it wanted to be taught lies between the lines, other
times it is expressed explicitly.  Regarding the indirect teachings, we can
regard the pedagogical purpose of some famous texts, aimed precisely to
teach the values of society and how to distinguish what is good from what
is bad.  Just to give a particular – and definitely – famous example, let's
think to “Odyssey” (but we will not discuss if this work belongs or not to
Homer). The author described the peoples encountered by Odysseus with a
mere pedagogical goal: the non-Greek civilizations are a negative example,
in order to emphasize the importance of values and customs of the Greek
people.
And Polyphemus3 can be a good and evident example. Indeed, the big one-
eyed  giant  is  described  as  a  brute  and  cruel  man-eaters:  so  the  first  –
intuitive – negative element is the cannibalism. Moreover, Polyphemus is a
shepherd who only eats products derived from his sheep: that indicates that
he was not accustomed to agriculture and agriculture itself, for the Greeks,
is  a  step  higher  compared to  sheep farming.  Lastly,  Polyphemus places
itself as equal to the gods, saying that he is not afraid about their reaction.
Therefore, he sinner and his sin is the “hubris”: he disrespected his own
3 The story about Polyphemus is described in the ninth book of Odyssey. 
3
gods, and that was quite inconceivable for a good Greek.
As shown, even at the time of the Greeks, there was a trial to influence the
behavior of people through the teaching of values, ethics and morals. 
Both the law and the social norm, therefore, figure out what is right to do
and what is wrong, deciding what we should do.
2) A short view on the interaction between law and social norm.
Laws  and  social  norms  can  interact  in  different  ways:  they  can
strengthen each other, the law can put an end to a social norm or help it to
arise. Or, vice-versa, a social norm can, in time, be crystallized in a law.
We can imagine several scenarios: in a primitive society, culture4 could be
enough to keep the order between the citizens.  The rules prescribed by
social norms are easy to apply, and the punishment for those who disobey
is strong enough to persuade people to follow those rules and to dissuade
them from any violation. The social norms could hold this kind of society.
But if there is a social development, if economy and technology arise, it
will  be  necessary  to  adapt  the rules  set  to  the  new needs:  so  the  legal
institutions take their the place in the governance of the society.
The interaction between law and culture is also important when we
talk about the creation of “social norms”.
4 An excellent definition is provided by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) in their work “Does 
culture affect economic outcomes”: there, culture is defined as “those customary beliefs and values 
that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged  from generation to generation.” 
We will resume it in the fourth paragraph and in the seventh footnote, page 7.
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This  issue  was analyzed by many lawyers  and social  scientists  and for
example, McAdams (1997)5, argued that there are different reasons behind
it: first, the existence of a consensus is mandatory, so that means that this
particular behavior has to be desirable. Secondly, there must be the chance
that this behavior could be observed by other people; and the lastly: this
consensus and this chance have to be part of the common knowledge.
If the consensus exists, the people will have an incentive to behave in that
way, and they will be probably esteemed for performing it. Furthermore, if
there is the chance to be observed by the others, a person will have another
incentive to perform that behavior.
Without these two requirements, a person won't have the right incentives to
act in such way. 
And here the role of the law in the birth of a social norm is shown: a law
about  a  specific  behavior  communicates  to  all  the  citizens  that  the two
above-mentioned conditions exist.
5 McAdams R. (1997), The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, Michigan Law Review 96, 
338 – 433.
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3) The definitions of Law and Social Norm.
The connection between law and social norms is not easy as it could
seem.  It  is  extremely  important,  for  a  better  understanding,  to  give  a
definition of the terms mentioned above, and to place them in the right set.
First of all, laws and social norms are both examples of institutions, but
each one represent a different kinds of them.
Following  the  classification  made  by  Douglas  North  (1991)6,  the
laws  are  a  kind  of  “formal  institutions”,  meanwhile  social  norms  are
“informal institutions”. When these definitions are used, we have to keep in
mind the differentiation between them.
The first one includes not only the laws, but also rules, the constitutions,
the  property  rights,  etc...;  meanwhile  the  second  one  comprehends
traditions, social norms, ethics, values and all the codes of conduct.
It's also not uncommon to find these two kind of institutions with other
names.  Indeed,  usually,  we  can  find  the  informal  institutions  called
“culture” and the formal ones called “institutions”.
It's quite difficult to find perfects definitions for them, because a lot
of terms are used to define culture and institutions, so it is correct to argue
that most of the problems are a matter of semantics: each author has his
own  preferences  defining  formal  institutions,  informal  institutions  and
culture.
6 North D. C. (1991), Institutions, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1), 97 – 112.
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4) What is meant by “culture”?
“Culture” has two different definitions: theoretical and empirical.
Following  the  empirical  concept,  culture  is  made  by  “those  customary
beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly
unchanged  from generation to generation.”7. In this concept, there are no
differences between beliefs and values.
The theoretical concept, on the contrary, distinguishes the two terms:
the beliefs are seen as ideas, shared by the people, that are able to influence
the interaction between them; the concept of “values” is more connected to
a primitive notion of culture, based on the role of emotions.
Anyway,  beliefs  and  values  interact  systematically:  beliefs  are
influenced by experience and from other people's advices and suggestions,
while values are more persistent:  they are part of individual personality,
absorbed in the first years of life, and it is quite difficult that learning from
experience would be strong enough to change and influence them.
That  is  the  power  of  social  norms:  the  intergenerational transmission.
Values  and  beliefs,  but  especially  the  first,  are  transmitted  from  a
generation  to  the  next  one;  and  that's  why  the  “cultural  rules”  are  so
persistent  in  time.  Hence,  values  and  beliefs  are  closely  related  to  the
family  environment,  but  not  only:  indeed,  even belonging to  a  specific
social group involves the absorption and transmission of values/beliefs, that
7 Guiso L., Sapienza P., Zingales L. (2006), Does culture affect economic outcomes?, Journal of 
economic perspectives, Spring 2006, 20 (2), 23 – 48.
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are proper of that particular social group.
As mentioned before, the culture had an important role especially in
the primitive society: a kind of good and honest conduct were bounded into
the family, a restricted circle of people. Outside of it, a different type of
behavior could be accepted: even though it was selfish, opportunistic and
utilitaristic; but a primitive kind of society could find it acceptable.
It is obvious that this view of life is totally in contrast with the more
modern and democratic societies, in which thinking that the correct code of
behavior could be limited to a small network is inconceivable.
Indeed, the idea of having to maintain always a code of good behavior is
part of this kind of society. 
The rise of this kind of mindset is strictly connected with the diffusion of a
generalized  morality8.  With  the  increase  of  cooperation,  mutual  trust,
respect  for  the  others  and  with  the  observance  of  laws  and  rights,  the
8 A note about this topic: “generalized morality” is considered as opposite to “limited morality”. 
Tabellini, in his “Institution and Culture” used these two parameters to analyze the incentive to the 
economic development. The main theme, here, is the cooperative behavior.
The “limited morality” is a characteristic of small societies, such as “the family” or “the clan”; while 
the “generalized morality” regards the case in which this behavior is extended in a large society. 
The analysis made by Tabellini is connected with the principle expressed by Platteau: “in hierarchical 
societies, codes of good conduct and honest behavior are confined to small circles of related people 
(such as members of the family or the clan). Outside this small network, opportunistic and highly 
selfish behavior is regarded as natural and morally acceptable. By contrast, in modern democratic 
societies the rules of good conduct are valid in all social situations, not only in a small network of 
friends and relatives”.
Tabellini G. (2008), Institutions and Culture, Journal of the European Economic Associations, 6 (2–
3), 255 – 294;
Platteau J. P. (2000), Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic Development, Academic Publishers 
and Routledge.
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reluctance  on  taking  advantage  of  other  people  penetrates  deep  in  the
individual. This generalized trust produces effects in different social fields,
such as politics, economy and public affairs.
But,  also  in  this  kind  of  society,  and  exaggerating,  in  the
sophisticated  society  with  the  most  complicated  formal  institutions,  the
culture is still playing an importing role. Indeed, also if the law seems more
powerful than the social norm, the law still need it to survive.
If there are conflicts between legal  and social  norms, compliance,
cooperation and enforcement inside the society will be weak; while, if the
values, such as trust, are deeply rooted in the people, the performance of
formal institutions will be facilitated: for example, there will be a greater
respect  for  the  law by  citizens;  and  politicians  will  be  less  inclined  to
corruption. Shortly, citizens will be inclined to give priority to the social
well-fare, rather than their own interests.
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5) What is meant by “formal institutions”? 
Two of the most famous definitions of formal institutions are made
by Douglas North (1990)9 and Avner Greif (2006)10.
North argued that the human interactions are structured by “formal
constrains  (rules,  laws,  constitutions)  and informal  constrains  (norms of
behavior,  convention,  and  self-imposed  codes  of  conduct),  and  their
enforcement characteristics11”. Furthermore, for North, institutions are “the
rules of the game”. Instead, Greif wrote that the “system of social factors
that conjointly generates a regularity of behavior” is the institution.
It  could  be  interesting  underlining  the  difference  between  those
definitions: for North, they are the rules of the game, and they are not the
way the game is played (and that is not necessarily the same thing; there is
a thin but difference in that); while Greif does not see them as rules, but as
equilibria of the game12.
9 North D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.
10 Greif  A. (2006), Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, 
Cambridge University Press.
11 This definition given by North has been criticized and contested by a large part of the scholars: they 
argued that it is not sufficient clear (See the following note).
12 “The problem with both definitions of institutions is that they overlap too much with culture, as 
“norms” and “conventions” are used to define both institutions and culture. This is especially true for 
Grief’s definition, which we find too broad and hard to quantify”. This is what was stated by Alesina 
and Giuliano, in “Culture and Institutions” in “Journal of Economic Literature, September 2014”; but 
it is not the only negative opinion about North's definition (and, in this case, also about Grief's 
definition). Indeed, also Geoffrey M. Hodgson in “What Are Institutions?” part of “Journal of 
economic issues, Vol.XL No.1 March 2006” disputes the distinction made by North. 
According to the author, the distinction between the two terms is too ambiguous and unclear.
In addition, Hodgson continuous, North used – too many times – different terms to define the formal 
institutions and the informal ones.
10
Another interesting definition of “formal institutions” is dispensed by
Helmke and Levitsky (2004): “formal institutions are openly codified, in
the sense that they are established and communicated through channels that
are  widely  accepted  as  official  (…),  informal  institutions  are  socially
shared  rules,  usually  unwritten,  that  are  created,  communicated,  and
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels13”.
Specifically, the author criticizes the fact that depending on the interpretation adopted, the informal 
institutions are “impoverished” and less important than formal ones. 
Alesina A., Giuliano P. (2014), Culture and Institutions, Journal of Economic Literature, September 
2014.
Hodgson G. M. (2006), What Are Institutions?, Journal of Economic Issues, March 2006, 40 (1).
13 Helmke G., Levitsky S. (2004), Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda, 
Cambridge Journals.
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CHAPTER TWO
HOW THE SOCIAL NORMS ARE DEVELOPED
AND HOW THEY INTERACT WITH THE FORMAL
INSTITUTIONS
Summary: 1.  Preamble.  2.  The “birth” of social  norms. 3.  Not all  the
social norms are “good norms”. 4. How human beings can influence a
social norm. 5. The creation of “formal institutions” and their interaction
with the “informal institutions”.
1) Preamble.
After  these necessary clarifications about the terminology, we will
address the topic of the birth of formal and informal institutions. First we
will  focus  on  the  creation  of  the  latter,  because  of  their  role  and  their
importance on the creation of formal institutions (on which we will  not
dwell  too  much).  In  the  end,  we  will  evaluate  how these  two types  of
institutions are interlinked and influence each other.
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2) The “birth” of social norms.
As stated above, living without “social norms” would be impossible,
because of their contribution in solving cooperative games14.  But we do
not have to believe that any kind of social norm performs this task. In fact,
we can assert that “some” social norms are born for this reason – to manage
problematic situations that people have to face – but not all of them are
made for  that.  Our assumption must  start  from the idea that  people are
smart enough to notice the problem and to find, by mutual agreement, an
appropriate solution to the problem.
“By mutual agreement” could have – talking about a civil society –
different  meanings:  so,  we could assume that  the entire  social  group is
involved in creating the right solution to the problem; but it could also be
that only few  people, or even only one of them, have been chosen to fulfill
this role.  This case is easy to imagine: given a specific problem, people
work hard to create a solution for it. But it is not always like that.
Sometimes, it is not easy to discern when and by whom the rule has
been created: in fact, the birth of the “social norm” may have taken place
slowly,  through  the  passage  of  time,  evolving  from  several  other
institutions,  and  therefore,  its  source  is  now  definitely  impossible  to
identify.
14 As suggested by Ullman Margalit and Ellickson in their works.‐
Ullman Margalit E. ‐ (1977), The Emergence of Norms, Oxford University Press, Oxford;
Ellickson R. (1991), Order without law: how neighbors settle disputes, Harvard University Press,  
Cambridge.
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So, the social  norm may not have a clear  origin,  as it  could have been
generated from another rule or it could have evolved slowly over time.
This  is  possible  because the social  norms are  closely influenced by the
behavior of people. Indeed, the people, through their behavior, interact with
each  other:  and  this  interaction  is  one  of  the  possible  causes  of  the
birth/modification/extinguishing a social norm15.
Returning to the first hypothesis, which envisages the creation of a
norm as  a  solution  to  a  problem (or  to  a  cooperative  game),  we  must
emphasize once again how difficult it is for a group of people (often very
large) decide what to do: i.e. if they may elect, or not, some “leaders” and
how to deal with the problem.
Moreover,  and  it  is  interesting  to  underline,  different  groups  of
people face the same problems, but without the possibility of exchanging
information about the solution of the problems (due to lack of appropriate
means of communication, or too distant geographical positions).  How is
therefore possible, for these social norms, to spread into the world? 
The  answer  can  be  provided  by  the  evolutionary  game  theory;
scholars of this topic explain the spread of social norms assuming that they
are born into norm-free environment – which it is practically impossible by
definition.
15 “A norm arises as the unintended aggregate outcome of a large number of such bargaining 
interactions” drawn from:
Eriksson L. (2015), Social Norms Theory and Development Economics, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper n.7450.
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Unlikely, to say the least, a “new norm” will be really new; indeed, it will
always be a  kind of  evolution of  a  previous norm. Some studies about
social  norms suggest  that,  sometimes  some people,  once  having gained
agreement from the other citizens, may arise as scholars and intrepeneurs
and provide for the creation of a “new norm”.
The birth of a social norm, however, can take place via another route:
what Ensminger and Knight (1997)16 called “bandwagon effect”.
It  can happen, according to this theory, that some individuals,  for some
special reason (i.e. an ideological or religious reason) may prefer a different
behavior.  The  fact  that  a  number  of  persons  differs  from the  majority,
choosing to behave differently, following the “dictates” of a social norm
that is not widespread but it is limited to that small social group, means that
this behavior is raised in front of the other associates, not only as different,
but also as an “alternative”. The utility functions of the individual subjects
are different among each other, clearly.
But the fact that a certain group of people has decided to act in a different
way, can ensure that some subjects – having a utility function similar to the
one of those that are dissociated from the majority – will prefer to follow
these people and imitate their behavior. By doing so, it is possible that more
and more people, having noticed “the alternative”, could decide to follow
this example, generating a wide change in behavior and the birth of another
16 Ensminger J., and Knight J. (1997), Changing social norms: Common Property, Bridewealth, and 
Clan Exogamy, Current Anthropology 38 (1), 1 – 24.
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social  norm.  This  effect,  precisely  “the  bandwagon”,  explains  how,
sometimes, some social norms arise and die very quickly.
The speed with which this phenomenon manifests itself can surprise
all the people involved. This is even more likely if the bandwagon effect is
connected to the “pluralist ignorance”. When we use this term we refer to a
situation in which the vast majority of the citizens believe that a certain
social norm is supported by the whole community. This belief means that
no one has the intention to do otherwise. 
Not only that: believing that this norm is supported by anyone, there is a
concern that acting otherwise could implicate, as a consequence, a social
sanction. This conviction makes people ignore the true state of affairs.
As it is easy to guess, the mix of these two phenomena leads to a very rapid
escalation of events. 
In this regard, we can mention the studies done by Kuran (1995)17,
about the fall of communism. In fact, as reported by the scholar, before the
fall of that regime, it was widely believed that it was supported by broad
consensus.  Both  from outside  and  inside,  it  was  taken  for  granted  that
everyone was satisfied with the communist regime. But as soon as a certain
number of people began to complain against the Communist government,
many others joined in the protest.
This protest, brought into being by those first people, did show to all the
17 Kuran T. (1995), Private Truths, Public Lies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
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other  citizens  that  the  regime  actually  was  not  supported  by  the  entire
population, and so the bandwagon effect occurred.
About this effect, it is important to note some details: the fact that
some  people  begin  to  deviate  from  the  widespread  (or,  rectius,  “the
believed  widespread”)  social  norm,  is  motivated  by  their  own personal
analysis of costs and benefits. The individual person, once understood to be
ready to face with the current norm, acts in the way that is better for him.
Clearly, if there is only one person acting differently or protesting against a
certain social norm, the social sanction would be virtually inevitable for
him. But when a lot of people act in this way, then results can be different,
as we already argued about.
Furthermore, there are also other important factors to mention about this
phenomenon: first, the more people act differently, the more people would
be punished, but this event could lead, ironically, to a reversal of positions
(we  can  imagine  a  community  made  by  10  persons:  if  only  one  acts
differently, the other nine will be able to punish him. But if the subjects to
act differently are nine, unlikely they will be punished by the other one).
So we can assert that the more people transgress the social norm, the more
people should be punished; but this is not always possible or desirable, as
in the example above. 
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Another detail to consider is that one of the “social sanctions” is the
contempt/disesteem18.  But  if  a  lot  of  people starts  to  “break” the social
norm, the other people will see this behavior less badly. 
Not only, in some cases, the social norm requires that each citizen must do
its part, must perform his duty. But if a certain part of the community is not
fulfilling its social duty, the other persons will feel justified to do not do
their part.
Additionally, we must remember that social norms can be ambiguous
and there could be conflicts between them19. Since there is not a guideline
to  resolve  such  conflicts,  it  is  normal  to  seek  support  looking  at  other
people behavior, not to punish them, but to emulate them.
These several aspects show us that not only the risk of social sanction
will be reduced, but also in the case it was applied, it would be much less
severe. By doing so, it is likely that more and more people will follow the
different  behavior  and  not  the  “active”  social  norm,  de  facto creating
another.
18 Perhaps in contemporary society, the value of esteem has been slightly lost , but if you think about a 
small community, the disesteem could mean being ostracized from society itself.
19 We should say few words about this fact: social norms may conflict with each other and be 
ambiguous.
Often, in addition, according to the choices of other people, we are obliged to choose a suitable 
“reaction” between the social norms: this could not be so easy.
Usually, in cases of uncertainty, we tend to look at the behaviors of other people in similar situations, 
or to remember how we behaved in the past (this leads to a very high differentiation of behaviors, 
since every person has different experiences).
Look to the past in search of a solution also explains why it is so difficult to change a social norm: we 
tend to grow fond of a certain behavior, so when a new norm changes the set  which we are 
accustomed to, we are reluctant to adapt to it.
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3) Not all the social norms are “good norms”.
As mentioned above, a social norm arise, theoretically, to face and
solve a cooperative problem, but not all of them are made for this reason.
But it  is wrong to think that every social norm is “good” ( namely that
involves  positive  consequences  for  the  social  well-being):  some  norms
have  not  big  consequences,  while  others  have  really  negative
consequences. We will call them “bad norms” and “neutral norms”:
◦ Bad  Norms: as  Lina  Eriksson  (2015)  suggested  in  her  work
“Social  Norms  Theory  and  Development  Economics”,  we  can
think about the “vendetta norm”, “ an eye for an eye”20. But how
does a “bad norm” to stay alive? 
The answer may seem controversial, but it concerns its effects.
Clearly, a norm such as vendetta, of course, does not encourage
peace  among  the  citizens  (on  the  contrary,  it  provides  and
promotes violence between them), but it serves to achieve it. In
fact,  almost  all  societies that  provided this type of norm, were
characterized by very peaceful and cordial behaviors inside them.
The motivation is, to say the least, obvious: the citizens, knowing
20 “The vendetta norm specifies that the appropriate response to an insult is to answer with an even 
greater insult, which the opponent – in order to preserve face – must then answer with an even greater 
one, and so it goes until at least one of the people involve (and often many) is dead (and sometimes it 
does not even end then)” again from:
Eriksson L. (2015), Social Norms Theory and Development Economics, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper n.7450.
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that the first “bad mistake” could start a real feud (which it could
mean, not only the death of the individual, but also the death of
his entire family), were very likely prone to avoid any kind of
conflict or tension.
Clearly, the social norm of vengeance is unsuited to contemporary
civil  society:  not  just  because  it  allows the use  of  violence  to
promote  peace,  but  precisely  because  if  there  is  a  contrast
between people, the situation would quickly degenerate. Making
peace a mere memory. All of these considerations raise another –
legitimate  –  doubt:  why  there  should  be  contrasts  between
citizens? Peace manifests itself to us as a Nash equilibrium (the
best strategy for the various possible subjects is to be courteous
and friendly), so, why someone should not want to achieve it?
Because, for different reasons (for example: anger) a person could
play a kind of strategy called “out of equilibrium”.
Another problem is related to the fact that a norm could be linked
to another one (quite often):  for example,  the “vendetta norm”
was related to the social norms about the “honor”. Consequently,
the reason why it is so difficult to change a norm appears really
obvious: very often, to change one norm, we have to change – not
only one, but – a group of linked norms. Changing a bad norm
can be uneasy when it was created to support a certain group of
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people, which certainly will fight to prevent any attempt to impair
it, once established21.
◦ Neutral Norms: the best example of this type are the “expressive
norms”. Our social behavior are almost entirely characterized by
them: they help us to express what we feel and what we want to
communicate to the others, only through our behaviors. They are
conventional  and  often  they  stem  from  old  customs  and
traditions; but their strength is to communicate easily, through a
gesture, what it would be – perhaps – difficult to say verbally or
in other  ways. We can think about  wearing black clothes  at  a
funeral  to  show  our  respect  and  sorrow,  or  wearing  elegant
dresses at a job interview; but this should not persuade us that for
every thing that we want to express there is an “expressive norm”.
21 There are other reasons behind the difficulty of changing a bad norm: the path dependency, the high 
transition costs, the pluralistic ignorance etc.
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4) How human beings can influence a social norm.
The importance of influencing social norms derives from the fact that
they, in their turn, influence human behavior.
Therefore, from the point of view of the social policy makers, it is better to
influence  social  norms:  so  it  would  be  possible  to  intervene  on human
behavior in an indirect manner and achieve the intended purposes.
The norms affect human behavior consciously (by acting on the beliefs of
the  subjects)  and  unconsciously  (by  acting  on  the  habits  and  on  the
automatism). Below, the main methods of conditioning:
◦ Using the behavior of others as an example: information as a
conditioning method. 
Informing the people about the behaviors of others has always
given  great  results.  This  method  has  been  used  repeatedly  in
campaigns  against  smoking,  against  domestic  violence,
etc...Through the diffusion of a “correct” pattern of behavior, this
method tries to convince the audience to follow suit  (the main
channels can be newspapers, television, posters and so on). 
Sometimes,  in  addition  to  suggesting  a  certain  behavior,  the
information  pertains  to  the  negative  consequences  that  would
result by not following the example22.
22 It may be interesting to note that the information about the negative consequences can be very 
effective even for those that do not usually behave in the “not recommended” way. In fact, the 
22
◦ Using  what  other  people  think  as  an  example:  again  the
information as a conditioning method. 
Theoretically,  there  should  not  be  much  difference  with  the
method  of  conditioning seen before.  But  in  practice,  there  are
divergences: in fact, while it is easy to demonstrate the behavior
of certain people,  it  is  very difficult  to prove what they think.
Furthermore,  it  is  possible  that  this  method  loses  heavily
importance if “pluralistic ignorance” is widespread.
◦ Social pressure.
Using the social pressure has always been an excellent way to
influence human behavior. We can imagine two scenarios: when
the consequences – that are negative for the community – of a
certain behavior are known, we can assume that if some citizens
will behave in that way, the others – through social pressure –
will strive to make them stop; secondly, if there is the need to
prevent a behavior in a group of people, it is possible to apply the
strict  rule  of  “punish  the  whole  group  when  a  single  entity
consequences could apply, not only to those who commit personally that particular action, but also to 
the people around them (we have to think again about smoking, and in this case, to the passive 
smoke). The diffusion of certain information concerning the risks of passive smoke often convince 
non-smokers to don't accept it; thus influencing twice the smokers: on one hand they receive the 
information already known – smoking kills – and on the other hand they will also receive the 
pressures of the non-smokers. 
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transgress”: it will ensure that the entire group will control itself,
wanting to prevent the general punishment. 
◦ The symbolic meaning.
Every behavior has a symbolic nature – its own interpretation –
given  by  the  people.  Changing  the  way  people  conceive  such
behavior,  we  influence,  implicitly,  also  the  “social  norm”  that
requires it. This may be preferable if influence/change the social
norm is too costly. 
Clearly, changing the interpretation of a behavior, it will make it
ambiguous; with the attendant risks. In fact, this “method” may
lead to negative, and not expected, effects: for example, it might
make people more inclined to break the social norms that provide
that  “ambiguous”  behavior (and the  reason is  easy  to  explain:
since the behavior is ambiguous, people will be less inclined to
“punish”,  precisely  because  of  its  ambiguity;  making  the
transgression more pleasing).
◦ The signalling function.
Any behavior can perform this function, if there is an audience to
observe it.  The intrinsic signal  behavior can be influenced,  but
also it can influence, in its turn, the audience itself (but changing
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the signal can also occur unintentionally, perhaps trying to change
the social norm). Usually, the policy makers influence the signals,
for example, by changing the transmission costs, or changing the
costs that derive from the meaning of that behavior. 
◦ Changing incentives.
Playing on the incentives can be a good way to influence a social
norm. There must be, behind, a precise knowledge of what the
purpose of this change will be, and about the possible resistance
the audience could oppose; furthermore, this forecast can help to
create a  plan to make this resistance less significant  and more
easily to overcome.
◦ Change the “messenger”.
Even those who transmits the message is important: in fact, the
audience is sensitive to the identity of the messenger. If this last
enjoys the respect, the esteem, of the audience, it will be easier
for the message to be absorbed (we can think about an expert, a
particularly  famous  person,  or  a  person  with  a  very  good
reputation, a member of the own family, etc...).
In addition to these methods to influence the social norm, it must be
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said that a good way to make “more digestible” a new norm is to link it to a
previous one, in a clear way. As human beings, we are more accustomed to
what is familiar to us. We can therefore draw up five steps to ensure that
the new norm will be integrated among the people, in the best way:
◦ demonstrating the link between the new and the old norm;
◦ explaining the reason behind the creation of the new norm;
◦ using some examples concerning the way in which the norm has
already been accepted in other similar contexts;
◦ using again some examples regarding the way in which the rule
was accepted, by leveraging on the people who have applied it
(especially if they are enjoying the respect of the people around
them);
◦ connecting the norm to a meta-norm, so as to demonstrate how
the  new one  is  already  practically  inserted  into  the  normative
system. 
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5) The creation of “formal institutions” and their interaction with the
“informal institutions”.
The analysis about the origins of the “formal institutions”,  can be
quite tricky and complicated; if, for example, we take the laws (as formal
institution) as the objects of our analysis: we see that their “constitutive
process” is long and complex; and in this context, decidedly out of place.
But the analysis of the reciprocal influences between culture and formal
institutions, in the creation of the latter, can be much more interesting and
coherent with our topic, 
We can understand this interaction looking at historical examples, provided
by Fischer (1989)23.
Fischer  studied  the  institutions  and  their  evolution  in  the  United
States, asserting as the four major waves of migration of settlers influenced
(with their values and their beliefs) the creation of laws.
The four waves brought with them the set of customs and values of their
place of origin:
◦ the Puritans, coming from the “East Anglia”, firmly believed in
social  order  and  education;  therefore,  their  laws  were
characterized in this way, promoting such values;
◦ instead,  the  Virginia  Cavaliers,  from  the  South  of  England,
believed in a sort of social inequality; supporting the diversity of
23 Fisher D. H. (1989), Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America, Oxford University Press, New 
York.
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classes. They introduced a tax system based on a reduced taxation
and  they  did  not  support  in  a  substantial  way  the  education
system;
◦ the  Quakers,  from  the  North  of  England,  promoted  personal
freedom  as  a  fundamental  value;  so  their  laws  emphasized
equality of citizens' rights and allowed a very limited government
intervention; 
◦ finally, the Scots-Irish believed in a – almost total – freedom of
the  individual.  Therefore,  they  created  a  government  with  an
almost non-existent power of intervention, with attached a very
constrained justice system.
Another useful example to our discussion may be the one provided
by Grief (1994)24.
The author analyzed the commercial relationship between the Maghribi and
the Genoese in the Middle Ages. The first ones were characterized by the
typical  values  of  the Jews and of  the Islam; therefore,  by  a  collectivist
perspective. On the other hand, the Genoese – Christians by definition –
had more “individualistic” values.
This difference in values was not a friction to the business relationship,
24 Greif A. (1994), Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical 
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualistic Societies, Journal of Political Economy, 102 (5), 912 – 
950.
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indeed: it drove the Genoese to create a set of “formal institutions” suited
to the needs of business practices.
Grief even explains how these new institutions (such as bills of lading) are
the  foundation  of  contemporary  business  practices.  Again,  values  have
influenced the creation of a normative set of laws.
So, this influence is tangible: as soon as different values lead to different
institutions. But as already mentioned, this relationship is not “a road with
one lane” - but, instead, a mutual influence.
Richard McAdams (1997)25, already mentioned in the first chapter,
claimed as a formal institution can radically change an informal one (the
examples made by McAdams are the American laws regarding smoking,
duels,  and  discrimination).  The  author's  thesis  is  clearly  possible  and
consistent, although there have been some oppositions: in fact, some other
authors have suggested that the effectiveness of the formal institutions on
the informal ones was only partly true. In their opinion, the social norms
regarding these issues (smoking, etc...  )  were already changing,  and the
new  formal  rules  have  done  nothing  but  follow  the  trend  of  change,
institutionalizing it.
In support of the “criticism” directed at McAdams' thesis, there are
data on all cases in which new formal institutions have not had the desired
– and predicted – effect on social norms.
25 McAdams R. (1997), The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, Michigan Law Review 96,
349.
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For example, examining the situations in the United States and in the South
America,  similar  laws  have  produced  different  effects,  o  they  did  not
produce effects at all.
Furthermore,  the  Serbs  maintained  their  informal  institutions  (values,
ethics,  culture,  and  so  on)  practically  intact,  despite  the  influence  and
pressure by the Turks and by their formal institutions.
Moreover, the existence of ghettos (where people belonging to the same
ethnic  and  religious  minority  live  –  or  is  forced  to  live)  seems  to  be
partially justified26 by this desire to keep intact a specific cultural identity,
precisely. 
But the case studies of their interaction are not limited to the – at
least  attempted  –  suppression  of  a  social  norm:  it  is  also  possible  that
formal and informal institutions may be – simply – in conflict; they may be
neutral and ignore each other, and they may even cooperate.
The case of conflict between institutions, to tell the truth, is not that
different from the case where a formal institutions try to suppress a social
norm, because in contrast with each other. 
We can say that they are two different levels of contrast: an early stage, and
26 It is worth adding that this “desire” simply explains how people prefer to stay with other people with 
whom they share the same cultural background, values and beliefs.
This argument can also be explained under a different view: indeed, knowing the values of a man, it is
possible to understand his actions and sometimes even predict them.
Clearly, what was stated, however, it does not want to be a sponsor of the ghettos, or an incentive to 
divide people by ethnicity, religion and so on. I wish to state my opinion, totally contrary to the 
existence of the ghettos; in favor of the so-called “melting pot”, based on the personal belief that all 
men are created as equal, and so they must live and be treated like equal.
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a stage where there is an attempt to cancel one of the two.
The  reason  behind  the  neutrality  often  lies  in  the  own  costs  of
institutions. In fact, McAdams – always in his “The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms” – citing the works of Lisa Bernstein (1996)27 and
Robert Ellickson (1986)28, stated how sometimes people prefer resorting to
the use of informal institutions rather than the use of formal institutions;
and the reason would be that the former have lower operating costs than the
latter.
Finally,  the  possible  co-existence  and/or  cooperation  of  the  two
different  types  of  institution  can  be  explained  by  stating  that  they  are
strengthening each other if they confirm the same principle.
As  it  is  easy  to  guess,  when  there  is  this  cooperation  between  social
institutions and formal rules, the entire system (where they belong) benefits
from that cooperation. In fact, if the institutions are connected efficiently
with  each  other  –  so  for  example,  the  values  of  the  community  are
protected and strengthened by the laws – it will be much easier to achieve
the  objectives  that  the  society  aims.  For  example,  an  economic
development is possible in a similar context.
At least in theory: it must be emphasized that it is very difficult to
pinpoint exactly which institution has a positive effect on another, and so
27 Bernstein L. (1996), Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
144.
28 Ellickson R. (1986), Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 
Faculty Scholarship Series paper n.466. 
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on. In addition, the role played by fate and by exogenous factors is very
critical, and yet difficult to quantify. 
Therefore,  it  is  best  to  say  that  the  context  described  above  can  be  a
necessary  reason  at  the  base  of  achieving  the  stated  objectives,  but
sometimes it can not be enough.
After having analyzed, briefly, what the institutions are and the way
they arise and interact between each other, the next chapter will enter in the
heart of the matter: the role of ethics today, and its relationship with formal
institutions. Nothing different from the interaction between social norms
and formal institutions, by the way, but we will try to examine how the
evolution and increasing importance of ethics has upset the idea of making
business.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE RISE OF ETHICS IN THE BUSINESS 
Summary:  1.  Introduction. 2.  The  rise  of  the  corporate  social
responsibility (CSR).  3.   The kind of responsibility of the corporations.  4.
From the birth of the CSR to the development of the Stakeholders Theory
and Corporate Citizenship. 5.  A new way to do business: the sustainable
development.
1) Introduction.
To talk about the development of business ethics concept, first of all,
we need to give a definition of what we mean when we are using this term.
An excellent explanation is provided by Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten
(2010): “ethics is concerned with the study of morality29 and the application
of reason to elucidate specific rules and principles that determine right and
wrong for a given situation”30.
Therefore,  the link between the informal  institutions  and ethics is
quite evident: we can also argue that there is a certain overlap of the two
29 To be clear, here is the definition of morality, always given by Crane and Matten (2010): “morality is 
concerned with the norms, values and beliefs embedded in social processes which define right and 
wrong for an individual or a community”. Please refer to the following footnote for more details.
30 Crane A., Matten D. (2010), Business Ethics: Managing corporate citizenship and sustainability in 
the age of globalization, Oxford University Press Inc., New York.
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terms. But it should, however, be underlined that while ethics is always part
of what we consider informal institutions, the contrary is not always true:
not all social norms regard ethics. 
Informal institutions, such as social and cultural norms, strictly relate to the
values and beliefs: exactly how ethics does; and this means that what has
been said about them before can be applied to this last concept.
In detail, here, the evolution of this kind of institution is the most
important aspect.  We have already explained how values and beliefs are
passed down from generation to  generation within the family  and other
specific social groups.  The intergenerational transmission –  as mentioned
above – makes them much more persistent  over time:  the changing (or
rather, the evolution) of values and beliefs, indeed, happens very slowly.
But it happens anyway.
Among the developments of ethics, the focal point of our discussion
will cover how the relationship between ethics and “doing business” has
changed.
Until  the  end  of  1900s,  economics  and  ethics  were  considered
diametrically opposed: economics has often been conceived as unethical; a
gray zone where the issues regarding the concepts of “right and wrong”
were  related  only  to  the  choices  that  must  be  made  to  reach  the  main
objective: profit.
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Indeed  Albert  Carr  (1968)31 argued  that  there  were  just  few
differences between poker and business. In fact, in both of them, lying and
bluffing are allowed and tolerated. Not only: they can lead to the “victory
of the game”. Defining business as unethical can be explained considering
that many companies, in order to reach an economic purpose, behave in a
incorrectly way (or at least, in a “undesirable” way). We can think about
conducts  such  as  the  discharge  of  radioactive  waste  into  rivers  or  the
pollution  due  to  a  strong  chemical  activity.  Citing  Ovid:  “Exitus  acta
probat”32.
But although the fact that companies behave unethically may seem
convincing,  it  implies  –  necessarily  –  the  existence  of  the  concept  of
“ethics”, from which they are detached. In addition, on the other hand, the
existence of ethics in the market is also discernible in the small things, in
the details. If the mutual trust between buyers and sellers did not exist, not
a single sale would be successful; in the same way, if the certain standard
of conduct and respect between employers and workers did not exist, no
bureau or company would be able to be productive. And so on.
For this reason we can say that even companies that behave in an unethical
manner, must necessarily adopt and maintain the basic ethical behaviors
(like trust and cooperation).
31 Carr A. (1968), Is business bluffing ethical? Harvard Business Review, January – February, 46.
32 “The result justifies the deed” drawn from Heroides, II Phyllis Demophoonti, 85, composed between 
the 25 and 16 B.C.
Publius Ovidius Naso (1475), Heroides, Napoli, Sixtus Riessinger. 
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So ethics in business is not an oxymoron as Collins (1994)33 thought, but a
true reality that is worth studying.
In addition, it is important to remember that not all the economists
have considered the business as unethical, as Carr did: in fact, in both the
thought  of  Adam Smith  and  Milton  Friedam,  the  role  of  ethics  is  not
marginal in the business. It is not even necessary to wait the thoughts of
these  famous  authors  to  find  out  some  reflections  about  the  ethics  in
economics: Aristotle mused about it in the Nicomachean Ethics; and during
the  Middle  Ages,  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  also  spoke  about  the  economic
activity under an ethical-religious view.
Aristotle,  specifically, in the Nicomachean Ethics, outlined what is
ethics, what is its purpose and who may be worthy to study it.
It is to emphasize that the work of the Greek philosopher is a set of notes,
published only after his death, in which – starting from common opinions –
he develops his own ethical analysis, specifically refuting those ordinary
and trivial beliefs. The philosopher considered ethics as a practical science,
aimed to seek a concrete goal: with this statement of position he detached
himself from what had been stated before by Plato, his teacher. Therefore,
Aristotle wondered about what this ultimate goal could be, and he found
the answer in the concept of “happiness”.
Actually,  the  type  of  ethics  described  by  the  Greek  philosopher  is  an
33 Collins J. W. (1994), Is Business ethics an oxymoron? Business Horizons, September – October, 1 – 
8.
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Eudaimonistic ethics, aimed to pursue happiness – to be distinguished from
the  Hedonistic ethics,  which aims to  achieve pleasure.  Aristotle  did not
deny the connection between pleasure and happiness,  but  he considered
that pleasure is only a secondary feeling, that man and animal may feel; on
the contrary, pure happiness is the ultimate purpose of every action, being
able, by itself, to motivate human choices.
After  that,  Aristotle  continued  by  connecting  the  definitions  of  justice,
virtue  and  friendship  to  it.  Then,  the  philosopher  explained  how  the
economy is directed towards the attainment of wealth, but unlike the other
practical sciences, economy is deeper, and the link that binds it to politics –
the science par excellence – is stronger. But he did not fail to criticize -
however - the economy itself, because wealth is not our ultimate purpose,
but only a means to achieve some other secondary objective.
The  studies  of  Aristotle  were  fundamental  to  the  studies  of  St.
Thomas Aquinas, who exalted Aristotle as the “Great Philosopher”.
But it is a mistake to consider St. Thomas only as a Christian Aristotelian;
and it is also necessary to specify that Thomas never dealt directly with
economics.  The  Italian  intellectual  wondered  about  the  following
questions: has the man – intended as a person who works in everyday life –
the economic right to sustain himself? And is he allowed to have personal
assets? Can a man engage in economic activities to have a certain wealth?
If for Aristotle these questions are trivial, given the organization and the
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level of development of the Greek  Polis, for Saint Thomas, instead, they
were a deep problem, because in the feudal organization people basically
had to care about everyday subsistence.
St. Thomas also expressed his opinion about trading: he defined it a natural
and legitimate activity, simply necessary to live. St. Thomas Aquinas, on
the contrary, stigmatized that kind of uncontrolled economic activity, that is
not necessary to gain what is necessary to human life, but depends on the
desire  of  increasing enrichment.  For  the  Saint,  this  type of  economy is
unnatural.
Aristotle's  theories  are  to  be  included  among  “traditional”  ethics
theories,  with those by Epicurus,  Seneca,  J.  Locke,  A. Smith, and other
philosophers. They – according to the definition given by Crane and Matten
– “have their origins in modernism, which emerged roughly during the 18th
century Enlightenment era. Modern thinkers strove for a rational, scientific
explanations  of  the  world  and  aimed  at  comprehensive,  inclusive,
theoretically coherent theories to explain nature, man and society”34.
The Traditional ethical theories belong to the normative category: in
the sense that they promote general rules and general principles of conduct
(and  they  differ  from the  descriptive  theories,  which  only  describe  the
ethical phenomena). Usually, from an ethical point of view, the normative
nature of the theories also implies absolutism:  and the absolutist  ethical
34 Crane A., Matten D. (2010), Business Ethics: Managing corporate citizenship and sustainability in 
the age of globalization, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 123.
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theories are concerned with the moral principles that must be applied in
real situations. The terms “right” and “wrong” simply indicate objective
qualities, which can be used to describe human actions: right and wrong are
concepts beyond individual subjects. 
Among  the  traditional  theories,  two  types  mainly  stand  out:  the
“Consequentialist” theories  and the “Non-Consequentialists” theories. The
difference lies in the object of the moral judgment: if you analyze the result
of a specific action (if the result is good, the action is desirable; if the result
is bad, then that conduct should not be engaged) then the theory in question
it  is  Consequentialist (or  Teleological);  but  if  the  theory  analyzes  the
intrinsic  principles  behind  the  action  (not  taking  into  consideration  the
result of the action) and the character of the acting subject, then the theory
is called Non-Consequentialist.
Among the Consequentialists  theories  there are  the  Utilitarianism,
the  Egoism and  the  Hedonism;  while  among  the  Non-Consequentialists
there are the Deontology and the Agent's Virtue.
◦ The Utilitarianism had among its major theorists Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill; this theory stated that an action was morally
right and desirable if its consequence and result had brought the
greatest  amount  of  happiness to the greatest  number of  people
(the people has – of course – to be linked and influenced by the
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action itself). So the right action par excellence is the one that
maximizes the benefit  and happiness;  it  does not  matter  if  the
acting subject is good or bad.
◦ The second Consequentialist theory is Egoism: this theory does
not care to maximize the happiness of a large amount of people,
but  it  theorizes  that  the right  action  is  the one that  meets  and
satisfies  the  personal  interests  of  the  subject.  The  connection
between moral egoism and psychological egoism is made by the
fact  that  each  person  acts  in  its  own  interest,  motivated  by
personal  desires  and  passions.  The  Egoism  theory  does  not
necessarily  intended  to  encourage  harmful  behavior  for  third
parties; it simply theorized that the right action for each subject is
the one that allows him to pursue a certain advantage.  Several
scholars  supported  this  theory,  among  which  the  names  of  H.
Sidgwick, A. Rand and F. Nietzsche stand out.
◦ Epicurus and Aristippus of Cyrene, on the contrary, asserted that
pleasure  as  the  only  supreme  good  a  man  can  reach.  The
Hedonistic Theory indicates the pleasure as  main objective for
humans: but not all pleasures are good, in fact some of them do
not lead to the real pleasure, and after an initial phase, they lead
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to pain, a feeling that the man should always try to avoid.
◦ Among  the  Non-Consequentialist  theories  we  have  the
Deontology, or  Ethics of Duties: it analyzes the moral principle,
the duty, which is the basis and the reason of a certain action. This
theory was supported by I. Kant and W. D. Ross, who claimed
that  the  moral  value  of  an  action  does  not  depend  on  the
consequences  that  it  implies,  but  on  the  intention  behind  the
action itself: so the actions are independent from their outcomes,
being intrinsically right or wrong.  Moreover, each subject has a
number of duties related to its actions. Kant added that human
actions could be motivated by pursuit of happiness and by reason:
so,  morality  depended  on  both  these  factors.  The  problem,
however,  was  about  the  mutability  of  happiness,  having  a
personal nature and being different from person to person. Only
the reason is universal and unconditional.
Kant therefore concluded that morality should depend only on the
reason, which is the Good Will. The reason, not being bounded by
personal interests, is based only on the duties, thus allowing the
subject to act in respect of the moral law.
According instead to the theories of W. D. Ross, the duties called
“prima facie duties” are the ones which determine what is right to
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do. Those duties are closely linked to a very strong moral reason
that justifies the existence of the duty itself; as example: to keep
promises, gratitude, fidelity and so on.
◦ The theory of “Agent's Virtue”, places at its center the morally
good character of the person or his disposition. Individual choices
are analyzed according to the disposition of the acting subject: in
this theory, the virtue has a leading role; it is a typical dowry of
the right man. Among the biggest supporters of this theory, we
find  Aristotle:  for  the  philosopher,  the  virtuous  person  always
knows what is right to do, thanks also to the role of experience,
and he is willing to behave in that way.
Regarding  instead  the  Contemporary  theories,  they  have  been
developed for the most part from the 20th century; modern philosophers
and thinkers criticized the Traditional theories, judging them too abstract
(Stark 1994)35, too rational (Bauman 1993)36, impersonal (Gilligan 1982)37
or imperialist.
Among the Contemporary theories stand out: the Ethical Relativism,
which aims to contextualize right and wrong, grounding the distinction on
35 Stark A. (1994), What's the matter with business ethics?, Harvard Business Review, May – June, 38 – 
48.
36 Bauman Z. (1993), Postmodern ethics, Blackwell, London.
37 Gilligan C. (1982), In a different voice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
42
what a specific society considers right or wrong; the  Postmodern Ethics,
which  regards  morality  as  something  that  is  beyond  the  sphere  of
rationality and that is strongly linked to the moral impulse rather than to
other human impulses; and Analytical Ethics, focused on meta-ethics, that
is aimed to analyze the status of ethical judgments and character of ethical
reasoning more than anything else.
This  excursus on ethical theories shows how – since the Greek Era
and before – the human being is wondering about the importance of ethics
on  human  choices;  and  it  makes  more  understandable  the  birth  and
evolution of  fields of study such as “Business Ethics”:  “...  the study of
business  situations,  activities,  and  decisions  where  issues  of  right  and
wrong are addressed”38.
We can try to understand the reasons behind this change of direction
– or, in other words, this evolution of thought – trying to outline its main
points.  First,  one  of  its  key  points  lies  in  the  growing  importance  of
business nowadays.
Large companies have more and more influence on government decisions,
or  at  least  this  is  the  widespread  belief  in  the  home countries  of  these
companies, according to research conducted by Cywinski39 in 2008.
38 The authors, using this combination “right – wrong”, they intend to exalt the moral meaning, and not 
the strictly economic one.
Crane A., Matten D. (2010), Business Ethics: Managing corporate citizenship and sustainability in 
the age of globalization, Oxford University Press Inc., New York.
39 Cywinski M. (2008), Influence of large corporations on government too strong, survey says, 19 
January 2008, in http://canadaone.com, last consultation: 29/06/2016.
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Indeed,  companies  can  produce  services  and  goods  that  are  desired  by
people.  This  capability  –  which  enables  the  dreams  of  our  collective
imagination  to  come  almost  true  and  tangible  (we  can  think  about  the
technological  innovations  of  recent  years,  from the  touch  screen to  the
current projects of  augmented reality viewers) – can be interpreted as an
engine of economic development. Not only that, the business can also be
considered a useful tool to positively promote the improvement of society
and not as a merely and cold tool for making money.
But the aspects that concern the growing importance of the business
ethics are not only positive.
Nowadays, if the role of ethics in the economy is so important it is because
the business  malpractices  are  downright  dangerous:  they are  capable  of
creating huge damage to individuals or to a multitude of subjects.
Furthermore, violations in this area are, still now, definitely too common,
and these two factors explain why it is important to dwell on the analysis of
business ethics.
This field of study provides the opportunity to understand the causes
behind  these  failure  and  provides  for  finding  a  solution.  Strengthening
further  the  ethical  values  of  future  classes  of  managers,  educating  and
making them ready for these new needs – perhaps – we will reach the goals
that we set ourselves looking for an ethical economy.
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2) The rise of the corporate social responsibility (CSR).
Another  big  and  important  consequence  of  the  (increasingly
important) role of ethics in the business is the birth of the concept of the
Corporate40 Social Responsibility.
This concept, according to the studies made by Carroll41 (2008), dates back
to – almost – a century ago; but it was not always willingly accepted by the
other  scholars:  for  example,  Milton  Friedman42,  in  1970,  published  an
article (with a certainly provocative title), in which he stated his contrary
opinion about the CSRs.
We will start exactly from these arguments to demonstrate the need
for these responsibilities.
The main points of this controversial theory are three:
40 First and foremost we must provide a definition of “corporation”: first of all they are not the 
individuals that compose them; in fact, according to the law, they are independent from those who 
work there, govern them and so on. They are separate entities.
To confirm this, when the individuals – that compose them – die, their corporations do not end with 
them. Simply, other people will replace the old ones in their own work tasks.
In addition, all the objects owned by the corporation, belong to it (and not to individuals, indeed – for 
example – a manager can not appropriate them thus).
Therefore we can say that the corporations are like “artificial persons”, but in the same way as 
physical and human persons, they have rights and duties and responsibility.
Among these responsibilities, first and foremost,  the one that concerns the investments of 
shareholders stands out for importance. The managers of corporations must act in the interests of the 
shareholders, so as to guarantee them a certain profit; but otherwise the damage and the debts created 
by corporations do not affect the managers, who have a limited liability. 
41 Carrol A.B. (2008), A history of corporate social responsibility: concepts and practices. In A. Crane, 
A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon and D. Siegel (eds.), The Oxford handbook of corporate social 
responsibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 9 – 46.
42 Friedman M. (1970), The social responsibility of business is to increase its profit, New York Times 
Magazine, 13 September.
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◦ Firstly, according to the opinion of the scholar, the corporations
can not have “moral” responsibility at all, because only humans
are characterized by it. Friedman's premise is simple:
corporations are not human beings, so they do not have this kind
of responsibility.
◦ Secondly, Friedman asserted that managers are hired with the sole
purpose to ensure profits to the corporation and its shareholders:
this  is  the  reason  for  their  recruitment  and  it  is  the  only  and
intrinsic reason of their work. The raison d'être of this premise is
the  legal  framework  established  by  society  for  the  business
activity.  The  shareholders  invest  to  gain  a  profit,  and  for  this
reason they rely on managers.
◦ The third point is that dealing with social problems is not the job
of the corporations. In fact, Friedman said that this “job” is a task
of the State; that managers are not prepared to deal with these
situations or to achieve particular social objectives (as opposed to
politicians, who – at least in theory – should know what is best
for the society and how to achieve those goals).
Starting from the first point, Friedman is not the only one to consider
that the corporations do not have a moral responsibility: also Joel Bakan43
43 Bakan J. (2004), The corporation: the pathological pursuit of profit and power, Constable and 
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(2004) expressed a similar idea in his book The Corporation44.
For Bakan, they are inherently selfish and unable to desire anything but
profit.  But,  apart  from these  opinions,  in  business  ethics  literature,  the
theories  in  support  of  the  existence  of  this  moral  responsibility  are  not
lacking. These above-mentioned theories assume that, although individuals
take decisions, there is, inside the corporation, an internal structure that is
Robinson, London.
44 This book was also the basis of a famous documentary, likewise titled, which has won numerous 
awards and accolades.
This documentary, created by Bakan, Mark Achbar and Jennifer Abbott, and published in 2004, offers 
a careful and thorough analysis of corporations.
In particular, it aims to analyze their nature and according to this one, it aims to demonstrate the total 
absence of moral responsibility.
The documentary was inspired by the scandals (related to the activities of corporations) that occurred 
in the early years of the twentieth century; and it introduces a fundamental question for the analysis 
itself: the unethical behaviors are due to the individuals who work for corporations, or are they due to 
the corporations themselves?
With that question, the film branches out in two directions: the first one strengthens the idea of Bakan 
itself (i.e. the corporations have only selfish goals and they aim to provide support only to their own 
interests); the second one tries to figure out who actually is to blame.
The corporations – it is explained in the documentary – are seen as “artificial persons” by the law, but 
if we compare them to the human beings, they would be psychopaths (and here is the link to the main 
theory of Bakan).
Regarding instead the search for a “culprit” behind the unethical behaviors, the documentary offers a 
variety of interesting interviews with celebrities and influential figures, such as the aforementioned 
Milton Friedman (Nobel Prize for Economics in 1976) and Michael Moore (famous director and 
author); but not only: in fact, there are also the views of the people who work “behind the scenes” in 
the business and marketing world.
Listening these interviews it is possible to understand that they are not “evil”; but their presence in 
such a context, like the corporations, made them “less human”: somehow, pursuing money and power 
dehumanizes the people.
Although this view is very pessimistic and – in my opinion – tragic, the documentary ends by opening
the doors to hope: for the authors, the situation is not entirely hopeless (also because the examined 
corporation models are those of the American-Canadian type , and therefore they are not necessarily 
spread around the globe).
Here are some excellent quotes:
Dr Robert Hare: “One of the questions that comes up periodically is to what extent could a 
corporation be considered to be psychopathic. And if we look at a corporation as a legal person, that it 
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specifically  dedicated  to  decide  which  decisions  have  to  be  taken:  this
internal structure (also called the “corporate internal decision structure”)
makes  sure  that  those  decisions  are  consistent  with  the  targets  of  the
corporation.  In  other  words,  it  means  that  –  although individuals  make
decisions – they express a will, that is no more their own, but is the specific
will of  the corporation.
Another factor in support of the moral responsibility of corporations
is the presence of a set of beliefs and values that the same multinational
corporations state as their own: this set is called “organizational culture”
(G. Moore 1999)45.
This alignment of values (which can vary from a corporation to another)
not only influence the macro social decisions, but it is able to change (or at
least, to influence) the values of the individual subjects who work there.
may not be that difficult to actually draw the transition between psychopathy in the individual to 
psychopathy in the corporation. We could go through the characteristics that define this disorder, one 
by one, to how they might apply to corporations. They would have all the characteristics, and, in fact, 
in many respects, the corporation of that sort is the proto-typical of a psychopath”.
Narrator (Mikela J. Mikael): “If the dominant institution of our time has been created in the image 
of a psychopath, who bears the moral responsibility for it's actions?”.
Milton Friedman: “Can a building have moral opinions? Can a building have social responsibility? If
a building can't have social responsibility, what does it mean to say that a corporation can? A 
corporation is simply an artificial legal structure. But the people who are engaged in it, whether the 
stockholders, whether the executives in it, whether the employees, they all have moral 
responsibilities”.
Drawn from The Corporation, a film by Mark Achbar, Jennifer Abbot and Joel Bakan, produced by 
Big Picture Media Corporation and distributed by Zeitgeist Film.
45 Moore G. (1999), Corporate moral agency: review and implications, Journal of Business Ethics, 21, 
329 – 343.
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The managers, in contact with an organizational culture, gradually conform
their values to this set46. So, the existence of an internal structure – created
for  selecting  which  decisions  are  consistent  with  the  values  of  the
corporation – and the presence of this basket of values recognized as the
organizational culture seem to manifest a sort of moral responsibility, or at
least a kind of responsibility that is different from the mere desire for profit.
It  must  be  said,  however,  that  although  a  different  type  of
responsibility  is  recognizable,  it  will  never  be  equal  to  that  kind  of
morality, that is proper to human beings.
Additionally, apart from the existence of a discourse about the moral
responsibility, it is necessary to point out that even the mere doubt about it
(or the mere fact that some scholars questioned about that) has created a
kind of alternative choice. Until then, this alternative was not present on the
behavioral  choices of the corporations:  now there is an expectation that
corporations are  obliged to behave in  a  certain – ethically  acceptable  –
way47.
Therefore, this has created an authentic internal interest: nowadays,
being ethically acceptable can be preferable for the corporations.
This convenience find its reason in few possible rewards for the company:
46 In my opinion, this theory – although it points to a different conclusion, is similar to the Bakan's 
theory: individual subjects, in contact with a similar context (such the business one), will conform 
their values (or they will lose them, according to Bakan) to the set of values and beliefs of the 
corporation.
47 Further, we might recall the aforementioned bandwagon effect.
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◦ first of all, it is possible that behaving ethically (and therefore, in
line with the expectations of a growing number of consumers),
results in a greater customer loyalty, and a reduction of possible
boycotts or demonstrations against the corporation; 
◦ it is also widely believed (The Economist, 2008)48 that an ethical
acceptable behavior enhances the reputation of the brand49;
◦ looking at the internal organization, if the corporation treats its
employees  in  the  best  way, they  will  be  more  related  to  the
corporation – with a positive influence on productivity itself; 
◦ in addition, according to another research (Globescan 2008)50, the
ethical  and  correct  treatment  of  workers  is  one  of  the  main
reasons thanks to which a corporation is considered morally and
ethically acceptable;
◦ further, it can be better for the corporation to act voluntarily in an
ethical manner as soon as such behavior could be imposed by law
and  by  the  government  –  and  not  a  single  corporation  could
benefit  from government influence over its choices;
◦ finally,  a  corporation,  acting  in  an  ethical  and  desirable  way,
contributes  positively  to  the  development  of  the  society:  this
48 The Economist (2008), A special report on corporate social responsibility. The Economist, 19 January
2008, 386 (8563), 1 – 24.
49 We will see in the next chapter some specific cases such as the Nike case documented by Simon 
Zadek in 2004.
50 CSR Monitor 2008, in pdf, in http://www.globescan.com, last consultation: 29/06/2016.
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could be considered a long term investment. Creating a better and
safer  world,  in  which there  is  a  kind of  collective  and ethical
consciousness, can also set up an excellent environment for future
economic activities. 
Regarding  these  reasons,  Friedman  (1970)51 expressed,  again,  his
contrary opinion in the existence of CSR: in fact all these reasons, although
valid for  the  scholar,  do not  concern the morality,  but  are  –  actually  –
linked  to  the  maximization  of  profit.  Corporations  have  an  economic
interest  in  behaving ethically:  if  the market  wants  them to keep certain
behaviors in order to sell, behaving in that manner translates itself into the
economic interests of the corporation.
For  commenting  Friedman's  opinion,  we  can  mention  two  other
scholars:  Bowie  (1991)52 and  Orlitzky  (2008)53.  The  first  stated  that
Friedman's theory was true: the focal point of the issue is the real and main
intention of  decision makers.  The second scholar,  instead,  stated that  in
both cases (the profit or the intention to behave ethically) it is difficult to
prove what lies at the basis of taken decisions. 
51 Friedman M. (1970), The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, New York Times 
Magazine, 13 September.
52 Bowie N. E. (1991), New directions in corporate social responsibility, Business Horizons, July – 
August, 34, 56 – 65.
53 Orlitzky M. (2008), Corporate social performance and financial performance: a research synthesis. 
In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon, and D. Siegel (eds.), The Oxford handbook of 
corporate social responsibility. Business Strategy and the Environment, 12 (4), 227 – 239.
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However,  after  having  examined  the  possible  motives  behind  the
ethical behaviors of the corporations, we must dwell on the moral reasons
that explain the need of CSR.
Corporations  business  activities  generate  externalities  that  can  be  both
positive and negative; in the latter case they produce side-effects that can
cause  serious  problems  to  the  people  (i.e.  pollution,  corruption,  stock
manipulation  et alia54), so it is desirable that they should strive to solve
these  problems  –  which  they  have  generated  –  and  that  they  should
undertake  to  prevent  them.  Moreover,  given  the  enormous  amount  of
resources a corporation has, it is desirable that a part of it could be used to
improve society (a sort of philanthropic responsibility).
54 As an example of the terrible consequences that can arise from industrial activity, we can recall the 
Bhopal disaster.
During the night between 2nd and 3rd December 1984, in Bhopal - Madhya Pradesh, India -, there 
was a gas leak from the UCIL (Union Carbide India Limited) pesticide plant. This incident led to the 
release of more than 42 tons of methyl isocyanate, causing about 4000 deaths only in the first weeks 
(although there were other estimates that indicated 8000 or 15000 deaths). It was calculated that in 
subsequent years the deaths related to the accident became – almost – 25 thousand.
Instead, the total number of people who have reported serious or irreparable damage and injuries 
amounts to 560 thousand.
The inquiry revealed that the probable cause of the disaster was due to lacks in the security and 
maintenance system.
The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was ordered to pay about $ 470 million - as compensation - to 
the Indian government: a very low amount compared to the size of the caused damage.
Furthermore, after more than 25 years, the Indian Court condemned eight UCC employees – involved 
in the disaster – to spend two years in prison and to pay a fee of about 2000 dollars, the maximun 
allowed by the Indian Law. So, also in this case the penalty was inadequate.
Sources:
Cosa fu il disastro di Bhopal, 3 December 2014, in http://www.ilpost.it, last consultation: 29/06/2016;
Taylor A. (2014), Bhopal: The World's Worst Industrial Disaster, 30 Years Later, 2 December 2014, in
photo, http://www.theatlantic.com, last consultation: 29/06/2016.
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Apart  from  these  two  reasons,  the  activities  carried  out  by  the
corporations  also  have  more  immediate  and  mundane  effects:  such  as
creating employment, or decreasing it, when they cease trading. However,
almost every action of corporations has effects on citizens, therefore it is
right that they have to assume liabilities resulting about those effects and,
furthermore,  not  only  in  relation  to  the  shareholders,  but  to  all  the
stakeholders.
3) The kind of responsibility of the corporations.
Sharing theories which assert the corporation responsibility, implies
the necessity to understand what type of responsibility it is.
One of the most popular models regarding CSR is the “Four-part model of
corporate social responsibility” by Archie Caroll (2009).
This model dates back to 2009, but actually, his first  draft goes back to
1979; then it was changed in 1991, only to be finally revised in 2009, with
the participation of Buchholtz55.
The model compares the CSR to a – sort of – pyramid formed by four
layers/levels. Each one is a kind of responsibility: economic, legal, ethical
and philanthropic:
55 Carroll A. B. (1979), A three dimensional model of corporate social performance, Academy of 
Management Review, 4, 497 – 505;
Carroll A. B. (1991), The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: toward the moral management 
of organizational stakeholders, Business Horizons, July – August, 39 – 48;
Carroll A. B. and Buchholtz A. K. (2009), Business and society: ethics and stakeholder management
(7th edn.), South – Western, Cincinnati.
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◦ The  economic  responsibility  is  the  base  of  the  pyramid:  each
business brought into being by a corporation includes a series of
elements,  perhaps  obvious,  but  necessary:  employees  must  be
fairly paid; shareholders need to see their money managed wisely
by  the  managers,  in  order  to  gain  a  future  profit;  the  final
product/output on the market must satisfy the consumers, and so
on. This is the base of the pyramid, the essence of the business,
and as well,  its  raison d'etre.  The corporation is responsible to
these  people.  This  type  of  responsibility  is  a  necessary
requirement for all corporations;
◦ the  second  level  of  the  pyramid  is  the  legal  responsibility:  it
requires that all the corporation activities have to deal with the
law, i.e. the formal institutions. Therefore, market strategies, such
as collusion, are prohibited. As we can see, this is a  necessary
requirement for all corporations. 
◦ After the essential requirements, there is the ethical responsibility.
It  provides that  corporations have to do what is  right  and fair,
even  when  these  behaviors  are  not  required  or  expressly
prescribed by law. Simply, we can say that this is what people
expect from corporations; indeed, this is just an expectation.
◦ The  last  floor  of  the  pyramid,  finally,  is  the  philanthropic
responsibility;  it  derives  from  the  Greek  word  φιλανθρωπία
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(philanthropy)56.  
It  provides  that  corporations  should  improve,  when  and  if
possible,  the lives of  workers,  the community  and the society.
This type of responsibility is desirable, but neither necessary nor
required  by  law;  for  this  reason  this  level  (i.e.  the  type  of
responsibility) is weakest of the pyramid.
By the way, this model has been strongly and mainly criticized for
two aspects: the first one concerns its incompleteness, because it does not
take into account the possibility of conflict between the different types of
responsibilities; instead, the second criticism is based on the origin of the
model,  since it  is  greatly  based on the American experience rather  than
being inspired by an international context.
4)  From  the  birth  of  the  CSR  to  the  development  of  the
Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Citizenship.
Along with the spread of CSR, another theory – in support of the
need for corporations responsibilities – was developed in the 80s.
This theory, called “the Stakeholder Theory” and made mainly by Edward
Freeman  (1984)57,  established  that  there  was  a  responsibility  by  the
56 It represents the concept of loving the humanity, generically, including all the possible aspects. 
57 Freeman R. E. (1984), Strategic management: a stakeholder approach, Pitman, Boston.
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corporations towards the so-called “stakeholders”58.
First of all, this theory is different from the “classic” approach of the CSR,
focusing its attention on the groups of subjects related with corporations
and to which the latter has responsibilities.
Clearly, it is important to define who are the “stakeholders”, because
in their original conception made by Edward Freeman they are the group of
people  who  “can  affect  or  is  affected  by  the  achievement  of  the
organization's  objectives”59. As  it  may  seem  intuitive,  this  original
definition is very wide and general, and for this reason many scholars gave
their own personal interpretation of this term. 
For example, in 1992, Hill and Jones argued that, in their opinion, the
stakeholders are the “constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm
(...)  established  through  the  existence  of  an  exchange  relationship  who
supply the firm with critical resources and in exchange each expects its
interests to be satisfied”60; or citing the definition jointly provided by Evan
and Freeman (1993), they are who “benefit from or are harmed by, and
whose rights are violated or respected by, corporate actions”61.
58 Usually, the term “stakeholder” is used to indicate: shareholders, creditors, customers, employees and 
syndicates. But we'll see in a few lines that several scholars have given different interpretations of this 
word.
59 Freeman R. E. (1984), Strategic management: a stakeholder approach, Pitman, Boston, 46.
60 Hill C. W. L., Jones G. R. (1992), Stakeholder-agency theory, Journal of Management Studies, 
March 1992, 29 (2), 131 – 154.
61 Evan W. M., Freeman R. E. (1993), A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kantian 
capitalism. In W. M. Hoffman and  R. E. Frederick (eds.), Business Ethics: readings and cases in 
corporate morality, McGraw – Hill, New York, 145 – 154.
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This last definition gives us the cue for theorizing the existence of
two  principles,  aimed  at  identifying  the  “stakeholders”:  the  first  one
involves the obligation – for the corporations – not to infringe any kind of
right to any person; the second one, instead, requires that the corporations
are responsible for their actions and for the effects arising from them.
Relying on the previous formulations and on these two principles, the
scholars Crane and Matten (2010) gave a further definition of the term: “a
stakeholder of a corporation is an individual or a group which either: is
harmed  by,  or  benefits  from,  the  corporation;  or  whose  rights  can  be
violated, or have to be respected, by the corporation”62.
We can therefore guess how different the company's conception and
its relationship are, compared to the traditional management model: in fact,
according  to  this  “classic”  conception,  the  corporation  would  be  only
linked  to  four  groups  of  people.  Customers,  suppliers,  creditors  and
employees are part of these four groups, but the greater significance lies in
this last one: the shareholders. They represent the true reason for being of
the firm, indeed it is held responsible to them.
On the other hand, the new conception proposed by the theory of
stakeholders,  provides  for  widened  firm's  relationships:  not  only  four
groups  but  many  more,  all  having  the  same  importance  regarding  the
profile of the responsibility. Thus, alongside the four initial groups, we will
62 Crane A., Matten D. (2010), Business Ethics: Managing corporate citizenship and sustainability in 
the age of globalization, Oxford University Press Inc., New York.
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have the competitors, the Government and so on; all of them characterized
by interdependent connections. 
We must  emphasise, however, that all stakeholders are subjected to
responsibility,  and specifically,  how Rowley (1997)63 theorized,  they are
accountable to their own stakeholders, and against those of the corporation;
doing so, a real network based on mutual responsibility is created.
As anticipated  by  the  title,  in  addition  to  the  development  of  the
Stakeholder Theory, in the 90's the term “corporate citizenship” began to
be,  gradually,  more  and more  used.  This  term was used to  identify  the
activities and the role that corporations had taken within the society; but
corporate citizenship has had more than just one interpretation, thus making
the term applicable in different contexts: in one case aimed to explain a
certain activity or behavior, in other ones, assuming other connotations64.
Although this ductility, the academic literature has established that
there  are  mainly  three  different  interpretations  (or  views)  of  this  term:
“limited”, “equivalent” and “extended”.
63 Rowley T. J. (1997), Moving beyond dyadic ties: a network theory of stakeholder influences, 
Academy of Management Review, 22 (4), 817 – 910.
64 Here, there are some examples the use of the term corporate citizenship:
“When operating effectively, the Company's community investment programmes should create 
sustainable, long-term value for our host communities and demonstrate the Company's citizenship. 
The critical question in regard to our success is whether we have managed to leave a lasting positive 
legacy in the communities where we operate” from the BHP Billiton – Full Sustainability Report 
2008; or “Total is committed to contributing to the sustainable development of host communities 
around the world. In addition to being a normal part of good corporate citizenship, this policy fosters 
good relationships with neighbours and greater acceptance of our operations” from Total - Corporate 
social responsibility report 2007.
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The first two of them, although they have the most widely spread
interpretations, does not add substantially anything new in the discourse of
corporate responsibility, going mainly to re-use the old concepts related to
the definition of CSR.
More specifically, the limited view of the term follows the definition
of “philanthropic responsibility” theorized  by Carroll in 199165.
So, corporate citizenship takes the form of that kind of responsibility that
the firm decides to undertake: in a primary concept, you can think about the
activities that the corporation could do to improve the life quality of the
community in which it  resides and works.  The problem  concerning this
interpretation  is  that  –  exactly  as  suggested  by  Carroll  –  this  type  of
responsibility is the weakest type; moreover, the fact that this concept of
corporate  citizenship  is  re-using  what  was  already  said  about  the
philanthropic responsibility, really does not seem to be enough to justify
the coining of that “new” term. 
Regarding  the  interpretation  called  “equivalent”,  it  is  called  so
depending on the corresponding definition of CSR. It is the second most
widespread interpretation, although it still does not add anything new. In
confirmation of what has just been said, the aforementioned Carroll – in his
paper  “The  four  faces  of  corporate  citizenship”66 –  used  the  same
65 Carroll A. B. (1991), The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: toward the moral management 
of organizational stakeholders, Business Horizons, July – August.
66 Carroll A. B. (1998), The four faces of corporate citizenship, Business and Society Review, 100 (1), 1 
– 7.
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definitions, which he had already used to describe the substance of CSR, to
describe the corporate citizenship.
If the first  interpretation does not justify the creation and the use of the
term  “corporate  citizenship”,  even  this  interpretation  fails  in  this  task;
rather, it creates a kind of redundancy. 
The “extended” view is the only one that offers an innovative profile
of the term:  it resumes the concept of “citizenship”, proper to the liberal
tradition, which indicates the existence and the interaction with a set  of
individual rights (Faulks, 2000)67.
This set of rights, in the opinion of T. H. Marshall (1965)68, consists
in three main areas: social, civil and political. These three kinds of rights –
at  least  in  theory  –  are  ruled  by  government  and  they  are  under
government's jurisdiction; therefore – at least apparently – they should not
concern the sphere of action of corporations; but since the importance of
the latter  ones and their  influence (into society and to the governments
themselves) are constantly increasing (and on the other side of the issue,
there is a steady decline in governments' governance capacity) it is not a
surprise that, using the term “corporate citizenship” we are referring to how
corporations  are  able  to  manage  this  set  of  rights.  In  this  perspectives,
corporations acquires a function and a role even in governing citizens.
67 Faulks K. (2000), Citizenship, Routledge, London, 55 – 82.
68 Marshall T. H. (1965), Class, citizenship and social development, Anchor Books, New York.
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In  the  area  of  social  rights69,  the  number  of  corporations,  which
perform  initiatives  related  to  welfare  state,  is  in  in  perpetual  growth.
Activities such as organizing canteens for needy and unfortunate people,
implementing and improving school facilities and better conditions in the
neighborhoods – and so on – are just some examples of the diverse range of
initiatives in which some firms are involved. Often, corporations are much
more active in developing countries: this is also due to the fact that in these
countries the governments could not be able to deal with those issues. The
problems behind these deficiencies can be varied, but it is exactly in these
cases  that  the  growing  importance  and  growing  influence  of  the
corporations can be seen.
Also  concerning  the  sphere  of  civil  rights70,  the  activities  of
corporations  are  more  noticeable  in  the  developing countries. They  can
influence government decisions, encouraging them to better assume their
responsibilities, but they may also have significant adverse affects – such as
in  the  (in)famous  case  of  Shell  against  Ogoni,  in  Nigeria71.  Even  the
69 The social rights are also called as “positive rights”; they grant the opportunity to the individual to 
participate – freely – to the community, allowing him to enjoy rights such as health-care or education.
70 They are also called as “negative rights”, among the simplest examples we can remind the property 
rights. They protect the individual from potential abuse, interference or interference by third parties – 
such as the Government – thus explaining their epithet “negative”: they deny a range of behaviors – 
all those activities that could harm a legally protected right of the individual – to third parties)
71 Shell (Royal Dutch Shell), the famous multinational company dedicated to oil and fuel production, 
began its activities in Nigeria in 1958. Precisely Shell settled in the Niger Delta Region, in south of 
Nigeria: an area called Ogoniland, inhabited by the Ogoni ethnic group. The population was not 
pleased with the arrival of the multinational: the advent of oil, its extraction and production had 
caused the pollution of the surrounding environment, thus causing the impoverishment of the 
inhabitants, who were for the most part farmers and fishermen. The opposition of the Ogoni, however,
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political  rights72 can  be  “helped”  or  “hampered”  by  corporations.  For
example, enjoying the support of a multinational ahead a political election
can be crucial for success.
Clearly,  this  participation  in  the  sphere  of  human  rights  by  the
corporations  can  be  –  maliciously  –  regarded  as  a  further  way  (and,
perhaps, the most underhanded) to make profit. On the other hand, we may
think that corporations are obliged to interact with these areas of human
rights  just  because communities  expect  this  behavior  and give rise  to a
social pressure on the firms.
was strongly repressed by the Nigerian police, following the request of Shell (the Nigerian 
government and the multinational famous firm had a close working relationship). 
In addition to the impoverishment of the area, and its pollution, Shell was said to be indirectly 
responsible for the murder of nine activists of MOSOP (The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People), including the well-known activist Ken Saro-Wiwa.
Various organizations for the protection of human rights (such as the Center for Constitutional Rights 
“CCR” and Earth Rights International “ERI”) denounced the multinational company for repeatedly 
violating human rights.
Only after years and years of litigation, Shell was sentenced to pay 15.5 million dollars in favor of the 
plaintiffs, although the oil company has never fully admitted his guilt.
Even though the Shell has stopped its oil production activities in Ogoniland, not all the facilities have 
been disposed: this has led to several oil spills, which further aggravated the environmental situation 
of the region.
This damage, in the opinion of the “United Nations Environmental Programme”, will be disposed in 
about 30 years of treatment.
Sources:
Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, in publications, in http://www.unep.org, last consultation: 
29/06/2016;
Factsheet: The Case Against Shell, 24 March 2009, in http://ccrjustice.org, last consultation: 
29/06/2016;
Keates E. (2015), After Decades of Death and Destruction, Shell Pays Just $83 Million for Recent Oil
Spills, 11 January 2015, in http://www.greenpeace.org, last consultation: 29/06/2016;
Zandonini G. (2015), Delta del Niger, nulla cambia dopo 20 anni dall'uccisione dell'attivista che 
sfidò la Shell, 4 November 2015, in solidarietà, diritti-umani, in http://www.repubblica.it, last 
consultation: 29/06/2016.
72 They allow the individual to vote or be voted, but they also allow to occupy certain political offices or 
to perform certain activities within the community.
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Aside from these criticisms, it is possible to affirm that this concept
offers – unlike the previous two – a new meaning and a different possibility
to  use  of  the  term;  although  this  interpretation  seems  to  describe  what
happens in real life, rather than regulating what should happen.
5) A new way to do business: the sustainable development.
The commercial  and economic activities,  carried out by firms and
corporations, have several collateral effects that can not pass unnoticed: for
the most part, we are talking about massive damages to the environment
and/or  to  the  communities.  Phenomena  such  as  the  environmental
pollution, the climate change, the increased production of wastes and the
destruction of local cultures are just some of the dramatic effects that the
intense activity of corporations may cause.
For  this  reason,  there  is  a  new  kind  of  responsibility  for  the
corporations: the responsibility related to sustainability. 
Actually, this term has become widely used and therefore it started to take
on different connotations: not only it is strictly used in the field of study
related to Business Ethics, but also the same corporations and governments
have increasingly made use of that term. Although this widespread use, the
main  concept  of  sustainability  is  related  to  “sustainable  development”;
namely,  as  defined  by  the  “World  Commission  on  Environment  and
Development” of 1987, it is the “development that meets the needs of the
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present  without  compromising  the  ability  of  future  generations  to  meet
their own needs73”.
The above definition is the starting point for few considerations: first of all,
this  concept  refers  to  the  “intergenerations  equity”;  in  other  words,  the
fairness of treatment between different generations (the present ones and
the future ones). In addition, the sustainable development is not just about
the  environmental  sphere,  but  it  also  would  concern  the  social  and
economic spheres.
The reason behind this  conceptual  expansion is attributable  to the
previously mentioned definition: the “intergenerations equity”, to be true,
must have a specific starting requirement: in order to achieve a situation of
real  equality  in  the  future,  a  fair  treatment  must  already  exist  between
today's generations. So the concept of intergenerational equity does nothing
but foresee a fair  treatment for  each person.  This conceptual  expansion,
however, also makes clear the difficulty of the achievement of this project:
indeed, in order to reach this kind of equity, it is necessary to address issues
such as extreme poverty and hunger.
However, having set the sustainable development in this way, we can
highlight  its  three  main  aspects:  environmental,  social  and  economic;
hence  we  can  regard  the  sustainable  development  as  a  long-term
investment, aimed to not change the system in a negative way (indeed, if
73 World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our Common Future, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
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possible, it could be aimed at improving it) complying with its three main
pillars.
The  scholar  John  Elkington  theorized  the  concept  of  the  Triple
Bottom Line (TBL),  which  almost  encompasses  what  it  was  previously
said: doing business can not have just the purpose to get a gain, but it must
have a wide range of social and environmental goals. By  analysing these
issues one by one, the targets related to the environment are – above all –
the objectives most related to sustainability.
The analysis of the concept of sustainability from an environmental point
of  view  has  its  origins  from the  concept  of  resource  scarcity.  In  fact,
assuming as true the following assumptions:
1. each resource is not infinite, by definition,
2. the production capacity of every resource is finite and limited,
3. there is a constant demographic growth,
it emerges that sustainable development must aim primarily to not waste
resources  and  to  regulate  their  utilization,  in  order  to  allow  future
generations to enjoy the same standard of living and to give them the same
kind of treatment, thus excluding a potential disadvantage .
Here it seems necessary to make a connection with the provisions
and the theories made by Harold Demsetz74 in 1967. Although the author –
father  of  classical  economic  analysis  of  law  –  wanted  to  affirm  the
74 Demsetz H. (1967), Toward a Theory of Property Rights, American Economic Review 57, 347 – 359.
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indispensability  of  private  property  to  the  detriment  of  the  common
property (as, indeed, some of his successors – as Garrett Hardin75 – wanted
to do), we can point out the similarity between what was said by the scholar
and what is provided by the concept of sustainable development from the
environmental point of view.
In fact,  if on one hand the private property is seen as the passage
from the state of nature to the more civilized, complex and rational forms
of  organization,  through  which you  can  internalize  more  efficiently  the
negative externalities derived from the conduct of the individuals, on the
another hand, also the sustainable development it is a more complex form
of civil and rational organization, aimed to avoid the early end of resources
and reduce the negative effects related to a not-regulated use of resources.
Furthermore, a Demsetz's sentence is emblematic for our topic, when
he is referring to the effects of the common property: “[t]he effects of a
person’s activities on his neighbors and on subsequent generations will not
be taken into account fully”, where the term “subsequent generations” is
perfectly pertinent with our discussion. 
A critical issue concerns the use of non-recyclable substances: since
they can not be utilized for a second use, they become a kind of ballast for
the  environment,  damaging  it  further.  Even  the  economic  concept  of
sustainable development originates from the concept of the limited scope of
75 Hardin G. (1968), The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162,1243–1248.
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the Earth.
Future generations are likely to be disadvantaged by the utilization
choices that present generations decide to adopt: in this perspective, it is
very  likely  that  future  generations  will  not  be  able  to  afford  the  same
standard of living, since these standards will be subject to decay. For this
reason,  this  conception  provides  that  corporations  should  be  able  to
conceive and develop a long-term investment system. Instead of aiming
only immediate gains, they will have to aim and to achieve lasting profits,
which will protect future generations. 
So,  the  sustainable  development  –  from the  economic  point  of  view –
would provide  that  corporations  must  avoid bad behaviors  (such as  the
constitutions  of  cartels,  corruption  et  alia)  because  they  undermine  the
foundations of long-term economic activities.
Regarding the social conception, it is fairly recent: it was born in the
90s,  linked  with  the  principle  of  Social  Justice76.  This  kind  of  justice
strongly recalls the concept of equity between generations and between all
the people, and therefore it is in contrast with the current distribution of
wealth. In fact, according to an UN report about the World Social Situation,
it is clear how the wealth is not equally distributed: about the world's gross
domestic product, its 80% is owned by almost 1 billion people, specifically
76 Although the birth of this perspective is quite recent – and largely due to the impact that the business 
activities, made by many corporations, have had on local communities in which they were allocated – 
we should not think that before the 90's there was any ideology related to social justice. 
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those who are living in developed countries; the remaining 20% is shared
by almost 5 billion people, all of them living in developing countries.
Clearly,  there  is  a  willingness,  at  least  apparently,  to  change  this
reality and to work in order to accomplish each task related to the concept
of sustainable development, but to change this state of things, it will be
necessary to deal  with other  big problems – and not only the problems
related to the externalities of economic activities – such as fighting against
child mortality, diseases such as HIV, poverty, et alia.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INSTITUTIONS AND ETHICS EVOLUTION:
FOUR SAMPLES
Summary: 1. Introduction. 2. The bifurcation of the forms of cooperation:
the clans in China, corporations in Europe.  3.  Historical analysis of the
facts behind the spread of clans and corporations.  4.  The unique case of
the Kuba Kingdom. 5.  Obedience to the rules: comparison between Kuba
descendants and the descendants of other villages. 6. Ethics influences on
business  strategies:  the  Nike  case. 7.  Ethics  influences  on  business
strategies: the McDonald's case.
1) Introduction.
In order  to strengthen what has been said in  previous chapters,  it
could  be  appropriate  to  examine  a  few  cases  in  the  evolution  of  the
institutions.
The  first  two  cases  will  focus  precisely  on  the  development  of
association and cooperation forms in China and Europe and the influence
of cultural  norms (informal institutions) on formal institutions and vice-
versa.  It  will  be  also  examined  how  historical  context,  customs  and
traditions  and  various  other  external  factors  can  lead  to  reinforce  the
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already present institutions, in order to entrench them in the society, or to
elicit changes in the citizenship behavior.
On the other side, instead, we will see how the impact of ethics on
the market  has  upset  the strategies  of  multinational  companies,  such as
Nike and McDonald's, which – all of a sudden – had to review their plans,
in order to adapt them to the new – ethical – market demands.
Although it is less obvious, also in this case we are talking about an
evolution in informal institutions, which are changing with all their related
values. 
2)  The  bifurcation  of  the  forms  of  cooperation:  clans  in  China,
corporations in Europe.
The  historical  and  cultural  differences  –  which  characterized,
respectively,  pre-modern  China  and Europe –  have  led  to  two different
forms of association and cooperation: clans and corporations.
Clans  are  forms  of  social  organization  based  on  kinship:  entire
families and relatives, connected to a certain male ancestor, are linked by
constraints of mutual loyalty. In times of need, clan members have (and
that is the mandatory nature of the constraint) to help other members in
need. This type of bond could arise in two ways: clearly, to be born in a
particular clan implied the membership, but it was also possible to join a
clan later, for examples, when several clans were fused together, or when a
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man wanted to boast a supposed descent (that is because, in the majority of
cases, the descent was self-proclaimed, which implied that it was nearly
impossible to control it).
On the other side, the corporations: forms of voluntary organization,
par excellence.  In this context  we use this term to refer  to all  forms of
voluntary aggregation made by people who share a common purpose77.
The main differences are obvious: on one hand we have a kinship
relation that is, almost, inevitable; on the other hand we have a mandatory
relation born as expression of will; one bond is made by membership, the
other  by  interests.  Although  these  differences,  both  these  forms  of
organization can serve the same purpose and they are suitable to provide
the same services: indeed, they may either provide the supply of different
77 Regarding this point, some explanations are necessary: here, the term “corporation” is used in the 
most general way, and it does not only cover the modern sense of that word.
In fact, if we refer only to the modern corporation, we consider just one of many types which I am 
referring to, citing the work of Grief and Tabellini. The modern corporations are companies acting and
recognized in law as a single entity/person; they are characterized mostly by two factors: the capacity 
to issue – or not – stock and if they are working to gain a profit, or not.
The corporations allowed to issue stock are called “stock corporations”, while the other kind is called 
“non-stock corporation”: the differences are about the ownership of the corporation, in the first one is 
through stock, in the second one is related to the membership.
Non-stock corporations are always not-for-profit corporations; while the stock corporations could 
decide to be or not to be for-profit. It is to underline that a registered corporation is seen by the law as 
a single person, and it has a legal personality; but its shareholders have a limited liability, limited to 
their investment. The corporation must then be distinguished from partnership.
Partnership is a form of aggregation, such as corporations: but in this case, each parter contributes 
economically (money, skills, property) and shares the profits and losses.
On this point, the partners may decide to share them equitably, or establish that some partners have 
limited liability. 
(Every legal system regulates with specific rules the structure of these two types of aggregation. This 
is done in order to protect the people who work and interact with them).
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types  of  assets  (club  goods  and/or  public  local  goods)78;  they  may
coordinate the relationship between state and market; and they are certainly
appropriate means to promote cooperation between different actors.
According to the studies made by Avner Grief and Guido Tabellini79,
(2015) these two forms of cooperation begin to spread in correspondence to
a different phenomenon: the weakening of the state (if not event the total
disappearance or lack of it). Precisely this phenomenon manifested itself in
the late 9th century, when the State provided to be inept in its tasks, and
people had to find other ways to live.
The diffusion of clans and corporations was very broad and lasting:
since  they  began to  spread,  they become more  and  more  important  for
people's life.
In China, on one hand, the clan took care of providing almost all the
possible  kinds  of  goods  and  services  that  members  might  need,  as
confirmed by Reynold's studies: “these clans are bound to assist each other
in any way that may be required”80.
78 A slight in-depth analysis: a club good is a kind of good that is characterized by non-rivalry (or partial 
non-rivalry) but from which it is possible to be excluded by the suppliers.
The exclusion, for example, can be caused by a control of members credentials at the entrance of a 
club. As a consequence, the revelation of preferences is not a problem for club goods. By choosing to 
be part of a club – in order to enjoy its benefits – a person reveals his preferences.
Regarding the local public goods, it applies what was said for club goods, but a local public good has 
a particular characteristic: its benefits are confined to a particular geographic area. A subject to be able
to enjoy, must reside in that zone.
79 Grief A., Tabellini G. (2015), The Clan and the Corporation: Sustaining Cooperation in China and 
Europe, CESifo Working Paper No. 5233 Category 6: Fiscal Policy, Macroeconomics and Growth 
February 2015.
80 Reynold's, (1869), Miscellany of Romance, General Literature, Science and Art, 20 (42), 157.
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And for this reason, the creation of clans and the subsequent membership
was definitely the best option for the Chinese people: indeed, as reported
by Rowe81, more than half of Jiangxi province – the southern province of
China, lying between the Yangtze River and the South hills – was divided
and organized into clans, during the 1800s. 
The situation in Europe was not so different: the corporations, under
different forms, provided the various public goods and services: e.g. cities
took care of school and legal enforcement, while monasteries and churches
were concerned to feed the poor. In Europe, as mentioned before, there was
not a single form of corporation, but a varied number: European people
understood  that  corporations  represented  the  best  way  to  achieve  their
common goals.
Although both of them performed – mostly – the same tasks, their
initial  differences,  due  to  their  composition,  created  other  deeper
differences:  indeed  both  clans  and  corporations  developed  diversified
ethical codes of conduct, disciplinary and judicial systems.
An example of these differences may actually be found in the penalty
system: although inside the clans there were punishments for those who
committed crimes and did not act properly – according to the standards of
the clan – the attention was focused mostly on the rules that they could not
break, rather than on the real offenses. Indeed, according to the Great Qing
81 Rowe W. T. (1998), Ancestral rites and political authority in late imperial China – Chen Hongmou in 
Jiangxi, Modern China, 24 (4), 386.
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Code, crimes were simply defined as behaviors that “ought not to be done”
(Article 386); moreover, since the clan were based on kinship relations and
on loyalty among blood relatives, we should assume that the intention to
deceive or commit some crime against another clan member was not too
common and it was rather the exception to the rule. 
On the other hand however, European corporations went on creating
ad hoc  formal procedures, aimed to strengthen law and the rules (i.e. the
legal codes), to forbid people from putting in place misconducts – being
them connected only by common interests – or at least less frequently than
their Chinese counterparts. 
Another  fundamental  difference  is  how these  two kinds  of  social
organization  strengthened  internal  cooperation:  the  reciprocal  moral
obligations were defined by kinship, and therefore they were stronger than
those defined only by a common interest, which indeed turned out to be
“impersonal”. 
This  discussion  recalls  what  has  been  said  by  Tabellini  (2008)82
regarding  morality:  the  exclusive  loyalty  aimed  at  their  relatives  is  an
indicator of a limited morality; while the interactions between people with
shared  interests  imply  –  on  the  contrary  –  a  generalized  morality.  The
number of initial differences between China and Europe have led to the
82 For further informations, see the 8th footnote.
Tabellini G. (2008), Institutions and Culture,  Journal of the European Economic Associations, 6 (2–
3), 255 – 294.
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establishment and therefore to the spread of various social institutions and a
different distribution of the “morality” parameter.
3)  Historical  analysis  of  the  facts  behind  the  spread  of  clans  and
corporations.
As anticipated, clans and organizations began to spread, respectively,
in  China  and  Europe  around  the  end  of  the  9th  century.  Clearly,  social
organizations related to kinship  had been pre-existing in both these two
parts of the world. 
The importance of the family name, in China, dates back at least to
the time when Confucius lived (551 – 479 B.C.), since the famous Chinese
philosopher defined marriage as a “union of two surnames, in friendship
and in love”83.
However,  the  first  clans  were  made by the nobles,  while  families
were the most widespread form of association among lower-class people.
Towards the end of the Song Dynasty (around the 1200s), however, clans
made  by  people  without  any  title  of  nobility  were  already  widespread:
indeed it was during this dynasty that the vast majority of the clans was
formed.
In Europe, as anticipated, the social groups linked to kinship were
mostly  tribes; they played a key role after the fall of the Western Roman
83 Dawson M. M. (ed.) (1915), The Ethics of Confucius, Putnam, New York, 153.
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Empire (476 A.D.). Germanic tribes had specific rules of conduct, and –
like clans – imposed a rule of mutual aid to blood relatives; and especially
when it was necessary to take the law into their own hands and to pay back
the wrongs84.
Although the concept of the corporation was already present during
the  Roman  Empire,  it  did  not  have  a  great  importance  as  a  social
organization: indeed, a corporation would need the Emperor's permission to
be formed. Furthermore, they were used to pursue the interests of the state
and of the Emperor.
Corporations, as we understand them in this context, date back again
at the end of 900s85 (Grief 2006, 2006a); but – while, at the same time, the
clans were spreading in China as the main form of cooperation – in Europe
they  had  a  marginal  role.  Towards  the  late  Middle  Ages,  indeed,  the
corporations had become the form of cooperation par excellence in Europe.
The  fact  that  the  State  was  particularly  weak,  between  the  9 th and 10th
centuries, was the excellent premise to allow the creation of these forms of
cooperation and it consisted in an incentive to migration. The individuals
were able to choose which organization they could become part,  basing
84 Fischer Drew K. (1991), The Laws of the Salian Franks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia.
85 As Grief reported in two of his works:
Greif A. (2006), Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge;
Greif A. (2006a), Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth, American Economic Review, 96 (2), 308 
– 312.
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their choice on parameters such as cultural affinities and common interests.
So, the migration allowed a sort of new beginning: there was a re-settling
of the already present population in both the territories in question86.
In  China,  individuals  had  to  choose  between  staying  with  their
relatives – and forming a clan which would provide for their needs – and
migrating, in order to build a new clan – always related to kinship87 (Rowe
2002). It is interesting to note that, although they restarted from zero, the
Chinese migrants continued to create clans, also if they were inserted in a
different  context,  having  the  possibility  to  create  and  join  a  form  of
association more similar to the European corporation. Same thing happened
with European immigrants: both these two civilizations were attached to
their traditions.
Several explanations may lie behind these differences between China
and  Europe,  such  as  religion,  penalty  and  criminal  system,  charity  and
donations.
◦ Religion:  it  is  one  of  the  main  differences  between  the  two
86 This event seems to recall the Tiebout theory, which argued that the efficiency will always be obtained
with local public goods. Given the fact that the market failure can be caused by the difficulties 
involved in transmitting information, Tiebout asserted that being able to choose rationally the town in 
which to live – which therefore offers the provision of local public goods that is closer to the ideal of 
the consumer – their preferences are revealed. So, if there are enough different types of communities 
and enough consumers with different preferences, we will get a fully efficient market result, since all 
the consumers will be situated in the optimal communities, according to their criteria.
In practice, the subjects will vote with their feet.
Tiebout C. (1956), A pure theory of local public expenditures, Journal of Political Economy, 5, 64. 
87 Rowe W. T. (2002), Social Stability and Social Change. In D. Twitchett and J.K. Fairbank (eds), The 
Cambridge History of China, 9, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 473 – 562.
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civilizations. Christianity spread the idea of a society that is based
on the individual and not on the family; in fact both the original
sin  and the  possible  salvation  of  the  soul  are  characteristic  of
every single human being. Although they were shared by every
human  being,  they  have  peculiar  characteristics  related  to  the
private and personal sphere. Moreover, rules as: “...who loves his
neighbor has fulfilled the law” and “Thou shalt love thy neighbor
as thyself”  (Romans 13:8 and Leviticus 19:18) indicate how the
concept of brotherly love, in the Christian religion, is extended
and applied to all the human beings.  It is to underline how the
Church  tried  to  counteract  the  too  broad  relatives  groups:
measures  against  the  adoption,  divorce  and  subsequent
remarriage, polygamy – and so on – were the means by which the
Church wanted to neutralize and discourage  this kind of habits.
In  China,  religion imposed that  true  loyalty  was rooted in  the
kinship  ties.  To  confirm  this,  we  can  quote  Confucius,  who
repeatedly underlined the indissolubility of kinship ties: in fact,
the relatives had a moral obligation to support each other, even
when one of them was clearly guilty (Anaclets XIII 18).
◦ Penalty  and  Criminal  System:  by  definition,  the  crime  is
immoral;  but in these two civilizations, the penalty system has
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evolved  in  a  very  different  way.  Although  today  it  may  seem
obvious that – at least in theory – the severity of the punishment
has to be correlated to the gravity of the committed crime; but
initially,  in  those  two  civilizations  there  was  a  significant
correlation  between  the  severity  of  the  punishment  and  the
identity of the author of the crime.
In Europe, the rejection of this kind of ideology was developed
only later in time; and principles of equality – claiming that the
law should be equal for all the people – were finally affirmed; on
the  contrary,  in  China,  the  relationship  between  offender  and
victim gradually gained more and more importance. Specifically
this  concept  was  linked  to  kinship  relation  between  involved
subjects  (even  in  the  early  20th century  there  were  deep
differences and inequalities of this kind).
◦ Charity and donations: there are mainly two types of donations:
personal and impersonal. Personal donations provide that charity
will be in favor of a familiar/known subject; on the contrary, the
impersonal  ones  are  in  favor  of  unknown  subjects.  In  China,
where the limited morality was widely spread, the first kind of
donations  prevailed;  in  Europe  –  mostly  characterized  by
generalized morality – the second type prevailed.
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These exogenous influences did nothing but consolidate the initial
differences between Europe and China; but they were not the only forms of
institutions  which  contributed  to  the  social  development  of  the  two
civilizations: even state and commercial institutions influenced decisively
on this development.
These types of institutions were born in different shapes just because
the existing differences between the two civilizations and – as the other
exogenous influences  – they did nothing but  reinforce this  diversity:  in
Europe, characterized by generalized morality and by cooperative relations
which were not related to kinship, impersonal trades were very popular and
they  represented  the  predominant  kind  of  business;  needless  to  say,  in
China it was all the  contrary. 
In  Europe,  thanks  to  this  type  of  trades,  credit  institutions  and
insurance were spread since the Middle Ages, while in China the first forms
of these institutions date back to 1800s. The European corporations also
stimulated  the  creation  of  institutions  aimed  to  ensure  fair  treatment  to
every  trader:  both  in  the  cases  when  the  trader  was  a  member  of  the
corporation, and when he was not.
Therefore, Tabellini and Grief mention the Community Responsibility
System (CRS), an institution aimed to fill  and fix the  lacks of the local
courts, forcing them to punish the own members inside the corporations,
when they were  found guilty.
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In China, meanwhile, the trading system provided – at least in theory
– that there was not a distinction between clan members and non-members:
“a clan should always watch its reputation by preventing its members form
harming  outsiders  and  by  refusing  its  offenders  clan  protection”88(Liu
1959). But in practice, the Chinese penalty system was still influenced by
the  limited  morality  –  typical  of  the  Chinese  clans  –  in  fact:  “the
punishment of a member who misbehaves against a non-clan member is
usually oral censure”89 (ibid.); as it may seem obvious, it was certainly not
a sanction which would discourage such behaviors (and on the contrary, the
crime committed by a foreigner against a clan member was much more
severe).
Another difference that emerges from the comparison between China
and Europe is about the role of state administrators: if in Europe, the bailiff
was  a  free  man  who  performed  public  offices;  in  China,  the  so-called
runner (in  Chinese:  yamen)  was regarded as a  slave or  a  prostitute:  an
immoral person who usually belonged to the lowest class, if not totally a
pauper. 
So, we can say that the clans in China – having become the main
form  of  social  aggregation,  aimed  at  promoting  cooperation  between
members  –  have  influenced  the  types  of  obligations  and  interactions,
88 Liu Hui-Chen Wang (1959), The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules,  Monographs of the Association 
for Asian Studies, 7, 152.
89 Ibid.
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making them mostly  more “personal”.  In Europe,  instead,  this  role was
taken over by corporations, characterized by generalized morality, which
influenced the obligatory relations toward the “impersonal” kind. 
These differences still persist, showing how both the types of institutions
have adapted themselves to social and cultural change over the centuries.
4) The unique case of the Kuba Kingdom.
The  influence  of  institutions  on  the  culture  will  be  examined,
specifically, regarding a particular kingdom created in Central Africa in the
1700s: the Kuba Kingdom. 
Before  the  creation  of  the  aforementioned  kingdom,  in  the  same
region there had been a strong migration of the Mongo's population; this
stream of migration brought the Bushong, the Pyang, the Bieeng – people
who integrated themselvese in the Kingdom – but also people who did not
made part of it, like the Lele. 
According  to  the  tradition,  the  inhabitants  of  Kuba  shared  their
origins with the Lele: from the ancestor Mboom, (a kind of divinity/entity),
to his son, Woot, the first man on Earth.
Woot was not the only son of Mboom, and all of them lived in a sort of first
village;  until  Woot  had  an  incestuous  relationship  with  his  sister.  This
relationship involved the expulsion of the couple and their children from
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the village,  creating the first  migration stream90 (Vansina  1978).  Always
according to tradition, both the Kuba and the Lele had their origin in the
generations of the sons of Woot; so, at least in theory, they had the same
birth and traditions.
The Kuba kingdom was created in the 17th century (the most common
date for this event is the year 1620) by a foreign king, Shyaam.
Shyaam was an eclectic king: he was originally a doctor and a magician,
he desired to introduce several technological, institutional and further kinds
of innovations, such as tobacco, palm wine, and initiation rituals; and he
self-proclaimed  as  the  king  of  the  Bushong91 (Varsina  1978).  Although
some stories narrated that the creation of the kingdom was peaceful, other
sources attested that Shyaam killed the previous king of Bushong. Once he
was the leader of this people, he united all the adjacent villages under his
control, creating effectively a fairly vast kingdom.
90 Vansina J. (1978), The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples, University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison, 32.
91 Ibid, 59 – 65.
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It was expanded between the three rivers which formed its natural
limits: Kasai River, Sankuru River and Lulua River. These rivers not only
delimited the domain of the kingdom, but they also served to separate the
Kuba from other populations92. The territory between the rivers was divided
into nine provinces, which were further divided into counties, and each one
of them had its own chief93 (Vansina 1978).
92 The picture is taken and belongs to the scientific article “The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: 
Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom” made by Sara Lowes, Nathan Nunn, James A. Robinson, Jonathan
Weigel, and published on 16 November 2015. 
93 Vansina J. (1978), The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples, University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison, 128.
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The king granted to specific individuals, called  Kolm, a part of the
executive power and he instituted four councils for the division of powers
and duties (such as: bureaucracy, rituals, governmental tasks et alia). So, as
Vansina attested, one of the main features of the Kuba Kingdom was the
balance of powers (and their subdivisions)94.
To  confirm  the  fact  that  this  kingdom  was  one  of  the  most
bureaucratized throughout the sub-Saharan Africa, the Kuba Kingdom was
also  famous  for  the  establishment  of  annual  census  (about  births  and
deaths), and for the establishment of annual fees for each village.
The kingdom was definitely developed even from a legal point view:
not only there was a real police authority to ensure the compliance of the
rules, but a trial by jury for quarrels and disputes was foreseen, and in some
cases even a sort of appeals court was required by law.
It  is  very  particular  that,  despite  having  a  real  developed  legal
system, the Kuba Kingdom did not know the handwriting: for example, the
penalty system was based on a simple principle: “the gravier the offense,
the heavier the penality”95 (Vansina 1971).
The  Kuba  Kingdom came  into  contact  with  Europe  in  1885,  Dr.
Ludwig Wolf was the first one to reach this realm. But the first to reach its
capital,  Mushenge,  was  William Sheppard,  a  Presbytarian  minister  with
94 Vansina J. (1978), The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples, University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison, 145 – 152.
95 Vansina J. (1971), A Traditional Legal System: The Kuba. In Yehudi A. Cohen (ed.), Man in 
Adaption: The Institutional Framework, Aldine-Atherton, Chicago, 141 – 142.
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African-American origins. He was only the first  of many of visitors;  as
long as in 1910 the entire Congolese territory became a Belgian colony.
Incredibly, the Kuba Kingdom – compared to other African kingdoms – did
not change much during the colonial regime. Varsina dedicated an entire
book in 2010 to this phenomenon; inside the seven chapters – in which this
book consists – the author described the kingdom as “the only precolonial
kingdom to survive nearly intact, the only territory of its kind and its size
encapsulated  in  the  colony's  administrative  grid  like  a  fly  in  amber”96
(Vansina 2010).
But  after  the  colonial  period,  the  information  about  the  Kuba
Kingdom decreased,  although the existence  of  the kingdom has,  in  any
case,  been  ascertained  by  the  expedition  that  the  scholars  Sara  Lowes,
Nathan Nunn, James A. Robinson and Jonathan Weigel have undertaken in
201397.
96 Vansina J. (2010), Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in Rural Congo, 1880-1960, University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 179. 
97 Lowes S., Nunn N., Robinson J. A., Weigel J. (2015), The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: 
Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom, NBER Working Paper No. 21798.
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5) Obedience to the rules: comparison between Kuba descendants and
the descendants of other villages.
During  their  expedition,  Sara  Lowes,  Nathan  Nunn,  James  A.
Robinson  and  Jonathan  Weigel  wanted  to  examine  how  culture  and
institutions can influence each other; to reach this objective, they carried
out two different experiments on a group of people from different ethnic
groups, but all from the same region.
The  group  had  been  composed  in  this  way  in  order  to  have  the
chance  to  examine  both  the  behavior  of  the  direct  descendants  of  the
original Kuba Kingdom – namely the descendants of ethnic groups as the
Bushong – and also the conduct of the descendants of those villages that
had never entered in the domain of the kingdom, such as the Lele. 
The experiments were the Resource Allocation Game (RAG) and a
variant of the Ultimatum Game (UG).
The  first  experiment,  a  non-strategic  game,  provided  that  each
individual had a classical dice (a six sides dice): half of the sides was white
and the other half was black. Along with the dice, each subject had also
included a  budget  of  3000CF, divided into 30 parts,  each one made by
100CF (the total corresponded to almost 3 days wage). It was explained to
every participant that he would have to roll the dice for 30 times during a
single game, betting each time on the color of the side that would come out.
Before each launch, the player had to associate a color  to himself (e.g.
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white) and the remaining color (in this case: black) to a hypothetical second
player. The game would have been repeated for 4 times then, each time
with a different second player:
1. a fellow citizen,
2. a person belonging to the same ethnic group,
3. a person who was not part of the same ethnic group,
4. the government.
If the dice, after the launch, had shown the side with the color which
was assigned to the first player, he would have won 100CF. This budget
would be put aside in a specific bag; otherwise, if the dice showed the other
color – matched to the hypothetical second player – he would have to put
100CF in a specific container destined to the unknown other player.
Once all the games were over, if the participants had followed the rules
correctly, there would be an average of 1500CF assigned to both sides: in
short, the total amount of CF would be divided equally.
Test  evidences  showed  instead  that  the  amount  of  CF  assigned  to  the
second  player  was  –  on  average  –  1002CF  (the  33%  of  the  total).
Furthermore,  by the experiment,  it  was clear  that  the Kuba descendants
were more inclined to cheat than other ethnic groups98.
98 The picture is taken and belongs to the scientific article “The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: 
Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom” made by Sara Lowes, Nathan Nunn, James A. Robinson, Jonathan
Weigel, and published on 16 November 2015. 
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The second game – a variant of the ultimatum game (UG) – provided
that a budget of 1000CF would be divided between two subjects; the first
player would decide how to divide it, the second player could accept or not
the division. In the case in which the second player had not considered the
division satisfactory, and he refused it, none of the participants would have
gained any CF.
Therefore the test  provided the following rules:  for  three times,  a
subject  –  taken  by  the  same  group  in  question  during  the  previous
experiment – would decide how to divide the amount of CF and for three
other times he would received the offer of other players and so he would
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have to decide whether to accept it or not.
A peculiarity of the experiment is that computers or other devices –
suitable for a digital simulation – were not used; instead, this experiment
was based on the use of real money. A further detail: the players would
have divided the 1000CF in a lonely tent – in peace and solitude – simply
putting the money in two separate envelopes. In addition, it was made clear
the closed envelopes would be opened in a special office and only later, and
if  the  offers  will  be  accepted,  the  players  would  be  recalled  –  always
anonymously – to withdraw the amounts of CF.
The  purpose  of  the  test  was  not  related  to  understand  how  the
division would take place, but the scholars wanted to see if the subjects, in
the solitude of the tent, would have stolen some money, at least in one of
the rounds. In fact,  since the incomes were not certain (if the offer was
refused), the only way to get an immediate profit was stealing. And that is
what is happened.
There were evidences that, at least in one round, 4.8% of the players
had stolen money; also in this case, the descendants of Kuba distinguished
themselves  negatively  by  a  higher  percentage  of  thefts  than  the  other
subjects of the test.
So the results of the experiments pointed out that the descendants of
that kingdom, which had distinguished themselves so much – for all the
entire  range  of  factors  seen  in  this  paragraph,  from the  administration
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system to the penalty system – in comparison to the other kingdoms and to
nearby villages, had a higher propensity for breaking the rules.
Scholars as Elias99, Foucault100 and Weber101 had explained how the
evolution of sophisticated institutions would lead to a kind of evolution of
people,  making them more  inclined to  the civil  life  and respect  for  the
rules; the study done by Sara Lowes, Nathan Nunn, James A. Robinson and
Jonathan Weigel shows on the contrary how institutions and culture (i.e.
formal and informal institutions) actually influence each other, but without
giving the desired result every time102.
6) Ethics influences on business strategies: the Nike case.
Having  examined  the  evolution  of  formal  institutions  and  their
relationship  with  informal  institutions,  we  still  have  to  examine  the
evolution of ethics, as an informal institution, in some specific cases.
The Nike brand is very famous in the sports world. Although Nike's
success  was  undisputed,  even  at  global  level,  in  1990s,  (when  Jeff
Ballinger, a famous activist, published a not too flattering article in which
he contested  the low wages  and pitiful  conditions  of  Nike's  workers  in
99 Elias N. (1994), The Civilizing Process, Blackwell, Oxford.
100Foucault M. (1995), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Vintage Books, New York.
101Weber E. (1976), Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford.
102The researchers, then, have been striving to find specified and direct causes of this behavior disposed 
to break the rules, but they have shown that neither geography, colonialism nor other exogenous 
influences have really affected this behavior trend. 
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Indonesia) the famous American brand was strongly criticized.
Consumers – increasingly sensitive to corporate social responsibility and
eager to a better respect for those moral and ethical standards, that were
gradually establishing themselves in those years – gave life to a wave of
protests, that became more and more constant. The protests were mainly
related to the work conditions in the supply chain, even if it is to emphasize
that Nike workers' conditions were not different from those of other brands.
Indeed,  Nike  ended  up  in  the  eye  of  the  storm  essentially  for  its
interplanetary fame and not because it  had been  behaving in a way that
could be considered worse if compared with other corporations' choices: in
this case, its reputation played as a disadvantage.
The  US  firm,  initially,  did  not  want  to  react  to  the  accusations:
owning a large sales volume, the corporation decided really not to worry
about these complaints. But this choice increased problems and criticisms,
so the firm decided that it could not sit there and just watch the events,
realizing that the phenomenon was not going to stop, and it seemed rather
destined to constant growth. Consumers were actually demanding a new
way of doing business: companies should not only had to pursue profit, but
they also had to care about moral, ethical and social issues in the contexts
in which they were  operating.
The first attempts to demonstrate how the conditions at the workplace
were more than good, surprisingly, did not lead to the desired result. 
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Nike hired real teams (and entire companies) to control the conditions of
workers in the chains supply. But the problem was the lack of experience of
these  teams;  so,  when  the  reports  –  documenting  the  compliance  with
working  conditions  standards  –  were  released,  they  were  judged  as
superficial,  increasing  the  criticism  (e.g.  the  report  by  Andrew  Young,
former ambassador of United Nations).
The various failures in its attempts to appear ethical and sustainable
led  Nike  to  create,  in  1996,  a  specific  department,  aimed  to  check  the
conformity of the supply chain management also in Nike's partner firms.
Not  only:  the  US  brand  decided to  establish,  in  1998,  a  Corporate
Responsibility  Department,  and  to  make  CSR  the  beating  heart  of  its
business. Therefore, Nike was engaged in a tight control of its nearly 9000
suppliers,  but  it  was  again  strongly  criticized  when  the  reports  do  not
mirrored expectations. Clearly, this situation was very frustrating for the
managers;  so,  an  additional  team,  headed  by  Maria  Eitel,  the  CR
department Vice-President, was set up, having the task to give an ultimate
answer. The drafted report unmasked the cause of all these problems: and it
was the same firm's attitude in doing business.
The problem was in the balance between ethical  development and
economic development: in fact, although the company had tried in every
way to meet expectations, starting from an ethical and moral point of view
– in this specific case, the expectations about working conditions –  Nike
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could not stop colliding with the fact that the profit was still seen as the
ultimate goal.
As example, the fact that Nike – like many other business brand – did
offer incentives for better performance (based on criteria such time, quality,
price, etc. ) has scuppered  several efforts to be ethical ans sustainable. In
fact,  it  encouraged suppliers to disregard the ethical code of conduct,  in
order to reach those bonus,  promised by the company. Furthermore,  for
each  endogenous  problem  Nike  was  losing  reputation  and  its  image
appeared degraded to the customers eye.
Changing  the  incentives  system could  be  a  possible  challenge  in
theory, but very difficult in practice: that foolish attempt to change the way
of doing business turned out being almost an insult  for all its suppliers;
especially  because  that  same  pattern  had  guaranteed  for  30  years  the
success  of  the  brand (but  clearly,  the  success  was  not  only  due  to  that
incentive model). 
Nike  itself  proved  to  be  reluctant  to  change  its  business  model;
reducing the suppliers, changing the agreements – and so on – were seen as
a  huge risk  from an economic  view,  potentially  more  harmful  than  the
protests.
The challenge for the company was therefore to adapt its strategy to
the new need, balancing the disadvantages of the present with the possible
future earnings.
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So, in those years, many campaigns were launched and funded by
brands such as Nike, and from Nike itself: for example in the US, during
the Clinton administration – and with the support of the same – the  Fair
Labor Association (FLA) – a non-profit association for the protection of
workers' rights – was launched.
The Council of Economic Priorities Accreditation Agency (CEPAA)
created in 1997 the standard SA 8000 (Social Accountability 8000:2008) to
control  and  standardize  some  aspects  –  in  particular,  those  related  to
corporate social responsibility – of business management.
Clearly, every initiative that was launched had different but similar
objectives, partners and other donors, including NGOs, public institutions
etc; all of these initiatives, however, responded to the need to standardize
the business with those standards that were now required by consumers –
as now required by UN conventions.
Nike took part in several of these initiatives (such as the FLA, above
cited);  in  2000,  the  CEO  of  the  brand,  Phil  Knight,  was  one  of  50
(approximately) participants to the launch of initiative promoted by Kofi
Annan (Ghanaian  diplomat  and the  seventh  UN Secretary-General):  the
Global Compact. This initiative was designed to encourage the adoption of
a type of sustainable and responsible business.
In this case, Nike, thanks to the presence of its CEO, distinguished itself
positively  because  Phil  Knight  was  the  only  CEO of  an  US company;
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furthermore he publicly declared,  after  the launch of  this  initiative,  that
Nike  would  have  given his  “support  of  mandatory  global  standards  for
social auditing...” also adding that “...every company should have to report
on their performance”103 about those standards.
Clearly, after this event, many other companies – made in USA – decided
to follow the Nike example.
Thus,  Nike  undertaken  a  policy  aimed  not  only  to  counter  the
received criticism, but also to promote a fair way of doing business: “Nike
is one of a few companies that believe, regardless of how this situation
arose, they must be part of the solution if they don’t want to be seen as part
of the problem”104. The experience of Nike case shows that responding to
criticism trying to save the reputation of the brand, and furthermore with
immediate solutions – to remove the problem as quickly as possible – may
not be the right choice and can not bring effective results. 
Nike, although there were relentlessly criticisms – even after the first
reactions of the brand – did not give up; and, indeed, changing its ways of
thinking and doing business, it has gone from being the subject of criticism
to being part of a sort of movement and evolution of work standards inside
the firms. In this case, it is clear how the development of ethics has totally
affected the rules of the game, which were adopted by the US firm until
then. 
103Zadek S. (2004), The Path to Corporate Responsibility, Harvard Business Review, 132.
104Ibid.
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7) Ethics influences on business strategies: the McDonald's case.
McDonald's – just  like Nike – is a multinational  corporation with
interplanetary fame.
Spread  throughout  the  world,  with  about  420000  employees  divided  in
approximately  36000  restaurants,  and  an  annual  turnover  of  around  25
billion, McDonald's is certainly the giant of the fast food par excellence.
But although its success is indisputable, the criticisms were not lacking:
between the '80s and the '90s the the fast food chain began to be targeted by
various activist groups. 
Indeed, McDonald's ended in the eye of the storm: it was criticized
by nutritionists, who accused the restaurant chain to promote a kind of very
unhealthy  and  hyper-caloric  food,  considered  also  a  joint  cause  of  the
increasing obesity, especially among the young; by the participants of anti-
globalization  movement,  who  attacked  and  occupied  some  buildings,
owned by McDonald's; by environmentalists and by animal rights activists,
who accused the firm of cruelty to animals; and so on.
In addition to the direct actions, such as those that were carried out
by Jose Bové and his “radical farmers” (it was a real campaign in defense
of the French local food, and against the import of American products),
McDonald's was targeted on the web, specifically from McSpotlight – a
site that dealt to spread criticism, especially related to the fields of nutrition
and health.
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These  areas were certainly the most criticized: being the fast food
giant, McDonald's became the scapegoat for the fight against obesity: the
menu – proposed by the  restaurant  chain  –  definitely  not  balanced and
hyper-caloric,  and  the  incentive  to  excess  due  by  the  sponsorship  of
Supersize Menu were among the highest causes of McDonald's troubles.
It was even shot a film-documentary, entitled mockingly “Supersize
Me”105 – kidding precisely the big menu portions.
The  firm's  first  reaction  was  around  2000s,  when  –  to  counter
criticism from nutritionists  –  McDonald's  introduced  in  its  menu  some
healthy products, such as salads, baby carrots instead of chips inside the
Happy  Meal and  fruits;  and  it  stopped  producing  the  supersize  menu.
McDonald's  also  sponsored  several  sporting  activities  aimed  at  young
audiences, to suggest how the secret behind a good health is a balanced diet
and a bit of sport.
The  fast  food  chain,  then,  tried  to  link  its  name  to  international
famous sports events, so it became the sponsor of the football tournament
UEFA EURO 2008 (and nowadays again:  McDonald's is  the sponsor of
UEFA EURO 2016).
However, these initiatives, taken by McDonald's, were viewed with
skepticism by many: also because some analysis turned out that the amount
105The documentary was starring and directed by Morgan Spurlock. In the documentary, Spurlock 
decided to eat for a whole month always and only McDonald's, to show how a diet based on that type 
of food is highly damaging. To confirm this, Spurlock was followed by a team of doctors, taking note 
of how his body was deteriorating gradually during this experiment.
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of calories present in the dressing sauce for salads was greater than in the
classic burger! Although these initiatives were not entirely well accepted,
the McDonald's strategy proved to be successful: the customers majority
has continued to order burgers, fries and sugar drink, despite criticism and
awareness about the unhealthiness of these products.
Probably,  for  an  average  consumer,  having  a  choice  between  the
classic burger menu and the salads is already an ethically acceptable and
sufficient  goal;  in  facts,  McDonald's  is  still  the  king  of  the  fast  food
restaurants. To confirm that the company is out from the eye of the storm,
the McSpotlight  site  was closed around 2005. Furthermore,  McDonald's
has recently been one of the official sponsors of the Expo 2015, held in
Milan.
Although the criticism received for this participation, the presence of
the American brand at an event like that, indicates the McDonald's will to
appear ethically appropriate and acceptable. 
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FINAL REMARKS
This thesis wanted to use the knowledge proper of the analysis of
institutions in order to frame the phenomenon of the ethics development.
In the first two chapters, I defined the terminology needed to understand
the work. Starting from the division suggested by Douglas North in 1991, I
described how the institutions, the rules of the game, are divided into two
types: formal and informal.
The first are real codified rules; the second ones are behaviors rooted
in time and customs, related to the spheres of ethics and values. After, I
explained the reciprocal influence of these two types of institutions: they
can strengthen each other and/or lead one of them to the end. Furthermore,
a  social  norm can  crystallize  in  a  codified  law,  or  fall  into  disuse:  the
possibility of interaction are numerous.
The  entire  second  chapter  is  based  on  these  interactions,  and  a
significant  point is the assumption that not all  social  norms are “good”.
Although  they  are  created  to  make  life  easier  and  help  us  in  solving
cooperative problems, they may also be “bad” norms (such as the vendetta
norm) or “neutral” norms (mostly intended to easily express sensations and
feelings).
I later described how a human being, conscious of the importance of
social norms, can try to influence them.
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The  reason  behind  this  desire  could  appear  simple,  but  it  hides  a
sophisticated intent: social norms influence human behavior; knowing how
to influence those rules means indirectly to be able to influence the other
people. 
The  third  chapter  is  totally  focused  on  the  development  of  the
concept of ethics – and specifically of the concept of business ethics – since
it is the main informal institution which is examined in this work.
Starting  from opposite  opinions  to  the  existence  of  such  concept
within  the  sphere  of  competence  of  economy,  there  is  a  long  series  of
opinions of famous scholars, from Carroll and Carr passing by Friedman,
Freeman and Moore. The evolution of the moral and ethical conscience in
people  overturns  the  way  to  make  business,  leading  to  the  creation  of
extraordinary  theories  such  as  Stakeholder  Theory  and  Corporate
Citizenship.
Having  analyzed  these  various  theories,  the  chapter  ends  with  a
parenthesis on sustainable development, one of the main objectives of the
ethical business.
This thesis wishes to highlight how often the studies in this field do
not consider that set of values called “ethics” as an informal institution, a
rule of the game.  Personally, I tried and wanted to emphasize that ethics
belongs to a field of studies proper of institutions, hoping to be able to
continue the research in future.
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The practical examples of the fourth and last chapter wanted, firstly,
to  highlight  how institutions,  formal  and informal  – laws and culture  –
influence each other:
◦ in a predictable  way, as  in the case of corporations and clans.
Different  cultural  traits  affect  the  first  formal  institutions,  thus
creating a kind of cycle – the informal institutions influenced the
creation  of  formal  institutions,  which  change  over  time  but
always  reconfirming  those  values  and  cultural  traits  that  gave
them a start;
◦ unexpectedly,  as  the  surprising  propensity  to  steal  of  the
descendants of the Kuba Kingdom compared to the descendants
of other villages. From an evolved kingdom like that, one would
expect  that  the  –  so  sophisticated  –  formal  institutions  could
influence the people behaviors  in  a  positive way,  reconfirming
that need and those will that had once led to the creation of those
sophisticated formal institutions themselves. 
The latter two cases are not so distant from these instances: Nike and
McDonald's are actors and audience of that change that started in the 90s:
the research and claim to an ethical business. Both the companies saws the
rules  of  the  game  suddenly  changing  and  imposing  an  unforeseen
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correction of their strategies.
Once again there were just rules that were affecting other rules; but
with  such  strong  influences  that,  if  in  a  first  moment  they  were  only
informal institutions,  it did not take long since they imposed themselves
and spread among the people, becoming real formal institutions: the UN
conventions are an example. 
So, if at first the corporations may simply not agree with the demands
of consumers (who realize that they can have a choice: between a business
which is only aimed to profit, and an ethical one), over the years they saw
promulgating real laws, bearers of these values: changing and adaptation
became necessary.
But this influence can be seen again in the Nike case: not only the
corporation  adapted  its  business  strategies,  but  it  was  so  influenced  to
become a promoter of those values, which initially had not been taken into
account and which had caused so many problems.
In  my  opinion,  the  study  of  institutions  –  an  already  deep  and
interesting study area – can embrace the study of ethics, thus increasing the
difficulty of the challenge in game.
103
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
ALESINA A., GIULIANO P. (2014), Culture and Institutions, Journal of 
Economic Literature, September 2014.
BAUMAN Z. (1993), Postmodern ethics, Blackwell, London.
BAKAN J. (2004), The corporation: the pathological pursuit of profit and 
power, Constable and Robinson, London.
BERNSTEIN L. (1996), Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, University of
Pennsylvania Law Review.
BOWIE N. E. (1991), New directions in corporate social responsibility, 
Business Horizons, 34, July – August, 56 – 65.
CARR A. (1968), Is business bluffing ethical?, Harvard Business Review, 
46, January – February.
CARROLL A. B. (1979), A three dimensional model of corporate social 
performance, Academy of Management Review, 4, 497 – 505.
- (1991), The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: toward the 
moral management of organizational stakeholders, Business 
Horizons, July – August.
- (1998), The four faces of corporate citizenship, Business and 
Society Review, 100 (1), 1 – 7.
- (2008), A history of corporate social responsibility: concepts and 
practices. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon and D. 
104
Siegel (eds.), The Oxford handbook of corporate social 
responsibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 19 – 46.
- and BUCHHOLTZ A. K. (2009), Business and society: ethics and
stakeholder management (7th edn.), South – Western, Cincinnati.
COLLINS J. W. (1994), Is Business ethics an oxymoron?, Business 
Horizons, September – October, 1 – 8.
CRANE A., MATTEN D. (2010), Business Ethics: Managing corporate 
citizenship and sustainability in the age of globalization, Oxford University
Press Inc., New York.
CYWINSKI M. (2008), Influence of large corporations on government 
too strong, survey says, 19 january 2008, CanadaOne.
DAWSON M. M. (ed.) (1915), The Ethics of Confucius, Putnam, New 
York, 153.
DEMSETZ H. (1967), Toward a Theory of Property Rights, American 
Economic Review 57, 347 – 359.
ELIAS N. (1994), The Civilizing Process, Blackwell, Oxford.
ELLICKSON R. (1986), Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among 
Neighbors in Shasta County, Faculty Scholarship Series Paper n.466. 
- (1991), Order without law: how neighbors settle disputes, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge.
ERIKSSON L. (2015), Social Norms Theory and Development 
Economics, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper n.7450.
105
ENSMINGER J., KNIGHT J. (1997), Changing social norms: Common 
Property, Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy, Current Anthropology, 38 (1), 1 
– 24.
EVAN W. M., FREEMAN R. E. (1993), A stakeholder theory of the 
modern corporation: Kantian capitalism. In W. M. Hoffman and R. E. 
Frederick (eds.), Business Ethics: readings and cases in corporate morality,
McGraw – Hill, New York, 145 – 154.
FAULKS K. (2000), Citizenship, Routledge, London, 55 – 82.
FISHER D. H. (1989), Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America, 
Oxford University Press, New York.
FISCHER DREW K. (1991), The Laws of the Salian Franks, University 
of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
FOUCAULT M. (1995), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
Vintage Books, New York.
FREEMAN R. E. (1984), Strategic management: a stakeholder approach,
Pitman,  Boston.
FRIEDMAN M. (1970), The social responsibility of business is to increase
its profit, New York Times Magazine, 13 September.
GILLIGAN C. (1982), In a different voice, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge.
GREIF A. (1994), Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A 
Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualistic 
106
Societies, Journal of Political Economy, 102 (5), 912 – 950.
- (2006), Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons 
from Medieval Trade, Cambridge University Press.
- (2006a), Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth, American 
Economic Review, 96 (2), 308 – 312.
- and TABELLINI G. (2015), The Clan and the Corporation: 
Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe, CESifo Working Paper
No. 5233 Category 6: Fiscal Policy, Macroeconomics and Growth 
February 2015.
GUISO L., SAPIENZA P., ZINGALES L. (2006), Does culture affect 
economic outcomes?, Journal of economic perspectives, Spring 2006, 20 
(2), 23 – 48.
- (2015), Corporate Culture, Societal Culture, and Institutions, EIEF 
Working Paper January 2015.
HARDIN G. (1968), The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162, 1243–
1248.
HILL C. W. L., JONES G. R. (1992), Stakeholder-agency theory, Journal
of Management Studies, March 1992, 29 (2), 131 – 154.
HELMKE G., LEVITSKY S. (2004), Informal Institutions and 
Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda, Cambridge Journals.
HODGSON G. M. (2006), What Are Institutions?, Journal of Economic 
Issues, March 2006, 40 (1). 
107
KURAN T. (1995), Private Truths, Public Lies, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge.
LIU HUI-CHEN WANG (1959), The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules,  
Monographs of the Association for Asian Studies, 7, 152.
LOWES S., NUNN N., ROBINSON J. A., WEIGEL J. (2015), The 
Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom, 
NBER Working Paper No. 21798.
MARSHALL T. H. (1965), Class, citizenship and social development, 
Anchor Books, New York.
MCADAMS R. (1997), The Origin, Development and Regulation of 
Norms, Michigan Law Review 96.
MOORE G. (1999), Corporate moral agency: review and implications, 
Journal of Business Ethics, 21,  329 – 343.
NORTH D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- (1991), Institutions, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1), 97-
112.
ORLITZKY M. (2008), Corporate social performance and financial 
performance: a research synthesis. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten,
J. Moon, and D. Siegel (eds.), The Oxford handbook of corporate social 
responsibility, Business Strategy and the Environment, 12 (4), 227 – 239.
108
PLATTEAU J. P. (2000), Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic 
Development, Academic Publishers and Routledge.
PUBLIUS OVIDIUS NASO, (1475), Heroides, Sixtus Riessinger, Napoli.
REYNOLD'S, (1869), Miscellany of Romance, General Literature, 
Science and Art, 20 (42), 157.
ROWE W. T. (1998), Ancestral rites and political authority in late imperial
China – Chen Hongmou in Jiangxi, Modern China, 24 (4), 386.
- (2002), Social Stability and Social Change. In D. Twitchett and J.K.
Fairbank (eds), The Cambridge History of China, 9, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 473 – 562.
ROWLEY T. J. (1997), Moving beyond dyadic ties: a network theory of 
stakeholder influences, Academy of Management Review, 22 (4), 817 – 910.
STARK A. (1994), What's the matter with business ethics?, Harvard 
Business Review, May – June, 38 – 48.
TABELLINI G. (2008), Institutions and Culture, Journal of the European 
Economic Associations, 6 (2–3), 255 – 294.
THE ECONOMIST (2008), A special report on corporate social 
responsibility, The Economist, 19 January 2008, 386 (8563), 1 – 24.
TIEBOUT C. (1956), A pure theory of local public expenditures, Journal 
of Political Economy, 5, 64. 
ULLMAN-MARGALIT E. (1977), The Emergence of Norms, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
109
VANSINA J. (1971), A Traditional Legal System: The Kuba. In Yehudi A. 
Cohen (ed.), Man in Adaption: The Institutional Framework, Aldine-
Atherton, Chicago, 141 – 142.
- (1978), The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison.
- (2010), Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in Rural Congo, 
1880-1960, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 179. 
WEBER E. (1976), Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural
France, 1870-1914, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT (1987), Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.
ZADEK S. (2004), The Path to Corporate Responsibility, Harvard 
Business Review, 132.
110
SITOGRAPHY:
Cosa fu il disastro di Bhopal, 3 December 2014, in http://www.ilpost.it, last
consultation: 29/06/2016.
CSR Monitor 2008, in pdf, in http://www.globescan.com, last consultation: 
29/06/2016.
CYWINSKI M. (2008), Influence of large corporations on government 
too strong, survey says, 19 January 2008, in http://canadaone.com, last 
consultation: 29/06/2016.
Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, in publications, in 
http://www.unep.org, last consultation: 29/06/2016.
Factsheet: The Case Against Shell, 24 March 2009, in http://ccrjustice.org, 
last consultation: 29/06/2016.
KEATES E. (2015), After Decades of Death and Destruction, Shell Pays 
Just $83 Million for Recent Oil Spills, 11 January 2015, in 
http://www.greenpeace.org, last consultation: 29/06/2016.
111
TAYLOR A. (2014), Bhopal: The World's Worst Industrial Disaster, 30 
Years Later, 2 December 2014, in photo, http://www.theatlantic.com, last 
consultation: 29/06/2016.
ZANDONINI  G. (2015),  Delta  del  Niger,  nulla  cambia  dopo  20  anni
dall'uccisione dell'attivista  che  sfidò  la  Shell, 4  November  2015,  in
solidarietà,  diritti-umani,  in  http://www.repubblica.it,  last  consultation:
29/06/2016.
112
